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The PBGC was established to insure defined benefit pension plans offered by
employers in the United States, by offering a statutorily-established benefit to
recipients of terminated pension plans. Since 2000, the number of employers
terminating underfunded pension plans afier seeking relief under Chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code has increased dramatically. The Bankruptcy Code strips
the PBGC ofprotections against underfunded plans, leaving the PBGC with an
unsecured claim. This Note explores the moral hazard that accompanies pension
insurance and encourages underfunding, and the dysfunctional relationship
between the Tax Code, ERISA, and the Bankruptcy Code, which places the
PBGC at a disadvantage when employers terminate their pension plans afier
filing bankruptcy. This Note discusses proposed solutions to both the
underfunding problem and the termination/liability paradox facing the PBGC
and concludes that Congress should amend ERISA to give the PBGC control
over funding waivers and allow the PBGC to perfect its claim against employers
that underfund their pension plans on a 'floating lien" basis.
I. INTRODUCTION: "A PAGE OF HISTORY IS WORTH A VOLUME OF LOGIC" 1
The economic downturn that began in the spring of 2000, and accelerated
after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, resulted in seven of the ten
largest corporate bankruptcies in United States history.2 Several industries were
* J.D., The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law 2005 (expected). The author
would like to thank first and foremost his wife, who patiently endured endless discussion of this
topic and countless Friday nights in the library, as well as Judge William T. Bodoh and John
Wilson for their helpful comments and discussion, and finally the editing team for their hard
work and perseverance in the face of profoundly tedious material.
I New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921). One of the themes of this Note
is that the rejection of pension plans by firms seeking to reorganize under Chapter 11 is an
abuse of the reorganization process under Chapter 11. Similar abuse occurred following the
Supreme Court's decision in Nat' Labor Relations Bd v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513
(1984), which allowed employers to unilaterally reject labor agreements in bankruptcy.
Congress responded to Bildisco by amending the Bankruptcy Code to place limits on an
employer's use of this awesome power. Reasoning by analogy, it is time for Congress to
consider, at the very least, changing the law to prevent further abuse of Chapter 11 among those
who underfund their pension plans and then terminate them in bankruptcy.
2 See BankruptcyData.com, Largest Corporate Bankruptcies, 1980-Present, at
http://www.bankruptcydata. com/Research/15_Largest.htm (last visited Nov. 10) [hereinafter
Largest Corporate Bankruptcies]. BankruptcyData.com is a division of New Generation
Research, Inc., a firm that provides research on distressed companies and bankrupt companies
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particularly ravaged, including steel producers and passenger airlines. 3 Many
firms in these and other industries sought to reorganize under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code.4 While in Chapter 11, some of these fins terminated their
pension plans5 after having systematically underfunded these plans.6 Upon
for investors. For more information see New Generation Research's website at
http://www.tumarounds.com.
3 BankruptcyData.com reports thirty-one major steel-related bankruptcies from 2000
through the third quarter of 2003. See BankruptcyData.com, Bankruptcy Search, at
http://www.bankruptcydata.com/findabrtop.asp (last visited Nov. 10, 2004). In addition, during
that same period, three major airlines-TWA, U.S. Airways and UAL Corp., and regional
carrier Midway-filed Chapter 11. See id. The bankruptcy of UAL Corp., the parent of United
Airlines, ranks as the eighth largest bankruptcy since 1980. See Largest Corporate
Bankruptcies, supra note 2.
4 According to data available from the American Bankruptcy Institute, the number of
Chapter 11 filings increased from 687 in 2000 to 930 in 2003, a 35.4% increase, reaching a
peak of 986 in 2002. See American Bankruptcy Institute, Annual U.S. Non-Business
Bankruptcy Filings by Chapter 2000-2003, available at http://www.abiworld.org/
ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm?ContentlD=8170 (last visited Nov. 10, 2004) (data
tabulated from source). While these data may include a small number of personal Chapter 11
cases, they reflect the dramatic increase in the number of corporate Chapter II filings over this
period.
5 The number of single-employer plan terminations increased from 92 in 2000 to 152 in
2003 and some of these were the largest terminations in the history of the PBGC. These data
and their implications are described more fully infra note 11 and accompanying text.
6 According to former director of the PBGC, Steven A. Kandarian, underfunding of plans
covered by the PBGC increased from less than $50 billion on Dec. 31, 2000 to over $350
billion on Sept. 15, 2003. See Steven A. Kandarian, Statement Before the Senate Governmental
Affairs Committee Subcommittee on Financial Management, the Budget, and International
Security 2 (Sept. 15, 2003), http://www.pbgc.gov/news/speeches/ testimony_091503.pdf
[hereinafter Statement of Steven A. Kandarian].
Because of the method by which plans are deemed adequately funded, employers often
report higher funding levels than actually exist. See id. at 6. Kandarian stated:
[I]n its last filing prior to termination, Bethlehem Steel reported that it was 84 percent
funded on a current liability basis. At termination, however, the plan was only 45 percent
funded on a termination basis-with total underfunding of $4.3 billion. Similarly, in its last
filing prior to termination, the US Airways pilots' plan reported that it was 94 percent
funded on a current liability basis. At termination, however, it was only 33 percent funded
on a tennination basis-with total underfunding of $2.5 billion.
Id. (citations omitted). See also Robert Kuttner, The Great American Pension-Fund Robbery,
Bus. WK., Sep. 8, 2003, at 24 (discussing methods by which "corporate sponsors of pension
plans have been systematically looting" those plans); Nanette Byrnes, The Benefits Trap, Bus.
WK., July 19, 2004, at 64, 71 ("A recent study by analysts at CreditSights Ltd. found that 85%
of the defined-benefit plans in the S&P 500 don't have enough assets to cover their pension
obligations."). In addition, several companies met their pension obligations by contributing
assets other than cash, such as real estate or stock to the plan. Id at 72. With improvements in
the stock market and rising interest rates, underfunding of covered plans again began to decline
through the first half of 2004 to a total of $278.6 billion. See News Release, PBGC, Companies
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termination of a plan covered by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
(PBGC), the quasi-corporate governmental agency created under the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)7 to insure pension plans, 8 the
PBGC assumes the liabilities of the plan.9 This relieves the employer of its
obligation to fund the plan,10 and frees up cash to help fund the firm's
reorganization. The number of plans terminated, the pension obligations assumed
by the PBGC, and the number of retirees receiving benefits from the PBGC rose
between 2000 and 2004 to levels never previously seen in the twenty-nine year
history of the agency. I Pension plans were terminated in the steel industry to
Report $278.6 Billion Pension Shortfall in Latest Filings with PBGC (Jun. 17, 2004), at
http://www.pbgc.gov/news/press-releases/2004/pr04_53.htm.
7 Codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000).
8 See 29 U.S.C. § 1321 (2000) (defining plans covered by PBGC insurance). The role of
the PBGC is discussed infra Part II.
9 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1322(a), 1322a(a) (2000).
10 As addressed infra Part IV, the PBGC theoretically receives a lien against the assets of
the corporation in the amount of the unfunded portion of the terminated plan. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 1362 (2000).
11 The following table illustrates the number of plans terminated, the amount of liabilities
assumed by the PBGC from terminated plans, the number of beneficiaries receiving benefits
from the PBGC, the PBGC's annual net loss, and the PBGC's net position (assets vs. liabilities)
for the period between 2000 and 2004.
Plans Liabilities Annual Net NetYear Terminated Assumed Participants Loss Position(millions) (millions)
2000 92 $126 541,000 $2,666 $9,704
2001 101 $1,102 624,000 -$1,972 $7,732
2002 157 $3,013 783,000 -$11,370 -$3,638
2003 152 $6,407 934,000 -$7,600 -$11,238
2004 192 $3,509 1,061,000 -$12,067 -$23,305
See 2000 PBGC ANN. REP. 1, 8, 39 (2001); 2001 PBGC ANN. REP. 1, 9, 40 (2002); 2002
PBGC ANN. REP. 1, 9, 43 (2003); 2003 PBGC ANN. REP. 2, 37 (2004); PBGC, PERFORMANCE
AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 2004 2, 36 (2004), at
http://www.pbgc.gov/publications/annrptiPARl 104.pdf (last visited Nov. 10, 2004) [hereinafter
PBGC, PERFORMANCE REPORT].
In 2002 the PBGC assumed the largest liability in its history following the termination of
four pension plans at bankrupt LTV Steel. The termination of these plans caused the largest
single loss in the history of the PBGC (about $1.9 billion), the largest single-source increase in
participants (83,000), and contributed to the largest net loss ($11.37 billion) and largest net
deficit ($3.6 billion) in the agency's history. See 2002 PBGC ANN. REP. 1 (2003). In 2003,
PBGC surpassed three of these milestones, absorbing its largest single-source loss (about $3.6
billion) and single source increase in participants (95,000) as a result of the termination of
Bethlehem Steel's pension plan, and accumulating its largest net deficit ($11.24 billion). See
2003 PBGC ANN. REP. 2 (2004).
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facilitate the consolidation of that industry. 12 U.S. Airways terminated its pilots'
pension plan as part of its reorganization in 2003, imposing over $600 million in
liabilities on the PBGC. In July of 2004, United Airlines ceased making payments
into its pension plans, which are underfunded by at least $6.4 billion.13
12 See Nanette Bymes, Is Wilbur Ross Crazy?, Bus. WK., Dec. 22, 2003, at 75, 80
(discussing the purchase of LTV Corp. and Bethlehem Steel by Wilbur Ross's International
Steel Group (ISG) and pointing out that his purchase of these assets "was contingent on the
companies' filing for bankruptcy and thereby shifting their pension obligations to the
[PBGC]"). Ross and his family of funds control 41.9% of ISG. See Registration Statement
Under the Securities Act of 1933, International Steel Group (Form S-I), July 31, 2003, at 95
available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1231868/000095015203007226/
0000950152-03-007226.txt. This stake was valued at over $1 billion based on the firm's initial
public offering price of $28 per share (with 95 million shares outstanding). Id. In November of
2004 ISG agreed to be acquired by Mittal Steel Co. for $4.5 billion, or $42 per share. See Adam
Aston et al., A New Goliath in Big Steel, Bus. WK., Nov. 8, 2004, at 47. It is estimated that Mr.
Ross will make a personal profit of $300 million on the transaction, while ISG shareholders will
make an additional $2.1 billion. See Michael Arndt, Melting Away Steel's Costs, Bus. WK.,
Nov. 8, 2004, at 48.
In return, the PBGC was saddled with an estimated $3.7 billion in pension liabilities from
Bethlehem Steel and $2.2 billion in pension liabilities from LTV. See Christopher Mumma,
Bethlehem Judge Allows Elimination of Benefits, BLOOMBERG NEWS, appearing in
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Mar. 25, 2003, at C9; US. in Biggest Pension Takeover on
Record, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 30,2002, at C5. According to Byrnes, "[p]eople close to [the PBGC]
say its view of Ross is that he benefited from PBGC getting hit with billions of dollars in
pension obligations and then had the gall to take public credit for saving the industry." See
Byrnes, supra at 80.
In early December 2002 the PBGC announced that it would seek to terminate bankrupt
National Steel Corp.'s pensions, assuming $1.1 billion in pension liabilities. See Ashley
McCall, Government Targets National Steel Pensions; Insurer Says Retirement Plan
Underfunded by $1.5 Billion, SOUTH BEND TRIB., Dec. 6, 2002, at Al. Shortly thereafter, a
bidding war for the assets of National Steel erupted between U.S. Steel and A.K. Steel, with
U.S. Steel ultimately winning control of National's assets. See Len Boselovic, National Bidding
War Won by USS; Bankruptcy Court Seen Likely to Approve Its $1.05 Billion Offer,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Apr. 18, 2003, at Al. As the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette succinctly
stated in its year-end review of local business, "[n]one of the successes [of the steel industry]
would have been possible without the Pension Benefit Guarantee [sic] Corp. assuming more
than $7 billion of the bankrupt steelmakers' unfunded pension obligations." No. 4 Local
Business Story of the Year; Steel Sees Big Changes, PrlTSBURGH POST-GAZETrE, Dec. 24,
2003, at B9.
In addition, pensions among the eleven U.S. airlines offering defined benefit plans
covering 444,000 participants were underfunded by $31 billion in the first half of 2004, while
those of seven firms within the steel industry covering an additional 213,000 participants were
underfunded by $6 billion. See Caroline Daniel, Airline Funds Plunge to Record $31bn.
Shortfall, FIN. TIMES, Jun. 18, 2004, at 30. Since the PBGC was created, airlines and the steel
industry have accounted for 70% of claims against the PBGC, while accounting for just 5% of
insured participants. Id.
13 Amy Borrus, Will the Bough Break?, Bus. WK., April 14, 2003, at 62 (reporting on
U.S. Airways pension termination); see Albert B. Crenshaw, United Plan for Pensions Not
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The consequences of pension termination are far-reaching and often severe.
Because the amount of benefits that can be provided to participants once the
PBGC assumes trusteeship over a plan is limited by law, 14 plan participants may
receive significantly less than what they were entitled to receive under their
original plan.' 5 As a result of the unprecedented number of plans terminated and
the amount by which those plans are underfunded, the PBGC's financial position
has deteriorated to a dangerous level.' 6 As losses accumulate at the PBGC and the
Legal, Agency Says, WASH. POST, Aug. 14, 2004, at El (discussing decision by UAL Corp. to
cease contributions to pensions while in bankruptcy). U.S. Airways filed a second petition for
Chapter 11 relief on September 12, 2004. The airline announced that it would not make $110
million in pension payments due September 15, 2004. See Susan Carey, US Airways Gives
Pension Warning, WALL ST. J., Sept. 14, 2004, at A3. In addition, the airline has asked for court
approval to terminate its remaining pension plans, which cover 53,000 current and former
machinists, flight attendants and other employees and are underfunded by an estimated $2.3
billion, of which the PBGC will be required to cover $2.1 billion. See Len Boselovic, US
Airways Tries to Shift Pension Bill of $2 Billion, PrIrSBURGH POST-GAZETrE, Sept. 15, 2004, at
A1; Dan Fitzpatrick, US Airways Asks Court to End 3 Union Contracts, Pensions, PrrrSBURGH
POST-GAZETrE, Nov. 13, 2004, at A7.
14 See 29 U.S.C. § 1322(b) (2000); see also infra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
15 U.S. Airways' retired pilots, particularly those who chose annuities rather than lump
sum payments upon retirement, faced possible losses of 65% of their retirement income from
U.S. Airways' termination of its defined benefit plan and the creation of a defined contribution
plan. See Keith L. Alexander, US Airways Cleared to Alter Plan; Firm Set to Emerge from
Bankruptcy, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 2003, at El; Byrnes, supra note 6, at 64; Frank Reeves, Big
Cuts in Pilots' Pension Possible; US Airways Says it Will Terminate Plan Unless Congress
Acts, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZE'rE, Jan. 17,2003, at Al; US Airways Ready to Exit Chapter 11,
AIRLNE Bus., Mar. 2003, at 13; see also David Moberg, Remaking Steel, Without Throwing its
Retirees on the Slagheap, Am. PROSPECT, July/Aug. 2003, at 17 (discussing similar results in
the steel industry).
The experience of U.S. Airways' pilots and the instability of the defined-benefit pension
system casts an ominous shadow upon the retirement security of 44 million Americans owed
over $1 trillion by plan sponsors. See Byrnes, supra note 6, at 66.
16 The General Accounting Office labeled the PBGC's single-employer program a "high
risk" in July 2003 when the PBGC's deficit stood at just $5.7 billion. Statement of Steven A.
Kandarian, supra note 6, at 3. The PBGC has acknowledged that its pension insurance
programs do not have "the resources to fully satisfy PBGC's long-term obligations to plan
participants." PBGC, PERFORMANCE REPORT, supra note 11, at 16.
A recent study by the Center on Federal Financial Institutions estimated the net present
value of the future claims that cannot be funded by the PBGC under current law and estimated
the date at which the PBGC's cash and investments would be exhausted by benefit obligations
and other costs. See DOUGLAS J. ELLIOTT, CENTER ON FEDERAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS,
PBGC: WHEN WILL THE CASH RUN OUT? (2004), available at
http://www.coffi.org/pubs/PBGC%2OWhen%2OWill%20the%2OCash%2ORun%20Out/20v8.
pdf This study presumed a 5% return on PBGC assets, $900 million in annual premiums after
2004, $2.7 billion in present value of underfunding taken on each year, and an estimate of
probable benefits paid. Id at 6.
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number of premium-paying plans decline, solvent plan providers face higher
premiums. 17
The increase in pension plans terminated by plan sponsors under Chapter 11
protection is reminiscent of a period in the early 1980s when employers used
Chapter 11 to unilaterally reject their labor contracts. In National Labor Relations
Board v. Bildisco & Bildisco,18 the Supreme Court held that § 365(a) of the
Bankruptcy Code 19 permitted employers to unilaterally reject collective
bargaining agreements "if the debtor can show that the collective-bargaining
agreement burdens the estate, and that after careful scrutiny, the equities balance
in favor of rejecting the labor contract."20 The Bildisco decision opened the doors
to employers seeking to reject their labor contracts when those contracts became
too burdensome, or simply inconvenient, by obtaining relief in bankruptcy, even
The base case scenario showed that the PBGC would run out of cash and investments by
2020, with $67 billion in unfunded obligations outstanding. Id. at 8. Possible solutions involved
a $67 billion taxpayer bailout (today, with the price tag rising over time), increasing annual
premiums from the approximately $900 million collected today to $3.9 billion, raising the
annual return on PBGC investments to 9.6% or reducing new claims to $200 million in present
value per year. Id. After 2019, assuming a constant level of premiums, cash inflow to the PBGC
from premiums net of administrative costs would cover just 9% of estimated obligations. Id at
17.
The study also estimated the consequences of United terminating its pension plans. Id at
18. When added to the model, United's termination shortened the life of the PBGC's assets by
one year, causing cash insolvency at the end of 2018 with the taxpayer bailout option increasing
to $68 billion. Id at 18-19.
It should be noted that this is not the first time the PBGC has faced a serious deficit. In the
early 1990s the PBGC experienced a similar increase in liabilities over assets, with the deficit
standing at $2.9 billion in 1993. See Leigh Allyson Wolfe, Note, Is Your Pension Safe? A Call
for Reform of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation and Protection of Pension Benefits, 24
Sw. U. L. REv. 145, 153 (1994).
17 See Statement of Steven A. Kandarian, supra note 6, at 1 ("When underfunded pension
plans terminate, three groups can lose: participants can see their benefits reduced, other
businesses can see their PBGC premiums go up, and ultimately Congress could call on
taxpayers to support the PBGC."). Kandarian further addresses the free-rider problem created
by plan termination, stating that
[w]hen PBGC takes over underfunded pension plans, financially healthy companies with
better-funded pension plans end up making transfers to financially weak companies with
chronically underfunded pension plans. If these transfers from strong to weak plans
become too large, then over time strong companies with well-funded plans may elect to
leave the system.
Id at 2.
18 Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984).
19 11 U.S.C § 365(a) (2000).
20 Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 526.
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when the employer was not insolvent. 21 Perhaps the most egregious abuse of
Bildisco occurred when Continental Airlines used Chapter 11 reorganization to
reject its labor contracts and cut wages in half, despite the fact that Continental
was not yet insolvent and had held only nominal discussions with its unions
regarding concessions. 22 Congress reacted swiftly, adding a new section to the
Code23 as part of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of
198424 to blunt the ease with which employers could reject their labor
agreements. 25 This new section sets out a process by which an employer must
21 The Bankruptcy Code does not require that a debtor be insolvent before filing a petition,
with the exception of municipalities. See generally 11 U.S.C § 109 (2000).
22 Continental initially relied on the decision by the Third Circuit. See In re Bildisco, 682
F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1982), a]j'd 465 U.S. 513 (1984). For a detailed account of Continental's use
of the Bildisco decision see THOMAS PETZINGER, JR., HARD LANDING 208-15 (1995) ("The
notion was so... intriguing: a perfectly solvent company, with a valuable franchise and assets
of tremendous value, nevertheless using bankruptcy as a way of escaping from wage
agreements it no longer wished to honor."); see also Jim McKay, 21 Years Ago, Continental
Got Its Way, PITSBURGH POST-GAZETtE, Nov. 13, 2004, A7 (discussing Continental's
relationship to § 1113 of the Code and the similarities between Continental's history and U.S.
Airways' second bankruptcy).
The competitive advantage to Continental from rejecting its labor contracts was
significant. For instance, in 1988 American Airlines was paying its captains over $12,000 per
month, while Continental was paying just over $5,000. See Mark C. Mathiesen, Comment,
Bankruptcy ofAirlines: Causes, Complaints, and Changes, 61 J. AIR L. & COM. 1017, 1031-32
(1996). Continental's parent company purchased Eastern Airlines in 1986. When Eastern filed
Chapter 11 in 1989, Continental agreed to a deal with the PBGC to cover a large portion of
Eastern's unfunded pension liabilities. Two months after the bankruptcy court presiding over
the Eastern case approved this deal, Continental filed Chapter 11 again and rejected the pension
agreement, making Continental a pioneer in the area of using Chapter 11 to evade employee
commitments. See JACK E. ROBINSON, FREEFALL 29, 40-87 (1992); Daniel Keating, Chapter
11's New Ten-Ton Monster: The PBGC and Bankruptcy, 77 MINN. L. REV. 803, 815-16
(1993).
23 Codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (2000).
24 Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-353, § 541,
98 Stat. 390-91.
25 Senator Dole, then chairman of the Courts Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, mentions Continental by name while speaking in support of this provision as it
came out of the conference committee. See 130 CONG. REc. S20,083, 20,084 (1984) (statement
of Sen. Dole), reprinted in 984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 576, 588 ("[T]he labor provision is prospective
only in application, to ensure that it will not be applied to cases pending in the courts today,
such as the Continental and Wicks cases, where its application after those companies are far
into their reorganization plans would work an impossible burden upon the litigants."). See also
ROBINSON, supra note 22, at 42 ("Largely because of the intense lobbying by labor in reaction
to [the] unilateral abrogation of Continental's collective bargaining agreements, in 1984
Congress amended the bankruptcy laws making it much more difficult for debtors to void their
union contracts.").
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negotiate with labor on the terms of the labor contract before a court may approve
its rejection.26
The use of Chapter 11 to relieve failed firms of their pension obligations
raises several questions, but none more important than whether or not the practice
is fair. At the heart of this issue is the question of who benefits from pension
underfunding and pension termination. Pension underfunding benefits
shareholders, who see higher net income attributable to their shares.27 Corporate
executives benefit from higher stock prices when they receive stock options and
performance-based bonuses tied to movements in the stock price. Executives
rarely lose when pension plans are terminated, largely because they receive
separate plans from the firms they head.28 The greatest beneficiaries of plan
terminations in Chapter 11 are pre-bankruptcy unsecured and priority creditors,
who realize a higher recovery absent mandatory payments into pension plans,29
26 See generally 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (2000).
27 See David Henry, Tripping Over Pension Shortfalls, Bus. WK. ONLINE, May 14, 2003,
available at htpYAvww.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/may2OO3/nf20030514_6402_dbOl4.htm
("[C]omplex accounting for fund assets and liabilities inflated companies' earnings during the
bull market and propped them up another couple of years afterward. The plans essentially made
the market look less expensive than it was.'); Janice Revell, Beware the Pension Monster; It
Lurks Behind Funny Accounting, Ready to Pounce on Unsuspecting Investors, FORTUNE, Dec.
9, 2002, at 99, 104 (reporting that if companies in the S&P 500 with large defined benefit plans
were forced to reduce their pension growth projections to 6.5% from a median of 9.2%, profits
for the S&P 500 as a whole would drop by $44 billion in 2003).
28 See 26 U.S.C. § 401(aX7)(A) (2000), amended by Economic Growth and Tax Relief
Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 61 1(c), 115 Stat. 38, 97 (limiting annual
compensation of each employee participating in the plan to $200,000, adjusted annually). Many
firms establish separate plans for executives to which cash payments are made. These plans are
held by the executives or a trustee, not the firm, and are not imperiled by bankruptcy. See Theo
Francis & Ellen E. Schultz, Guess Whose Retirement Benefits Aren't Endangered?; Many
Companies Set Up Trusts to Protect Huge Pensions for Top Executives, WALL ST. J., Apr. 6,
2003, at B 1. However, the creation of such plans is not entirely risk free. When it appeared as
though American Airlines was funding such a plan in advance of a possible bankruptcy filing in
2003, unions "went ballistic," costing then-CEO Donald J. Carty his job. See Kuttner, supra
note 6, at 24.
29 Under a Chapter I I plan, each impaired class of claims must receive the present value
of what that class would receive under Chapter 7 (liquidation). See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(ii)
(2000). This means that secured creditors will receive the amount of their allowed secured
claim. See id § 506(a). And undersecured creditors can choose to take the § I lll(b)(2)
election, which will force the debtor to pay the full amount of the creditor's claim, both the
secured and the unsecured portion. See id § 111 l(bX2). The plan must also provide for the full
payment of priority claims upon confirmation. See id. § 1 129(a)(9). Treating the PBGC's claim
as an unsecured claim rather than secured frees up resources that can be used to pay priority
creditors and increases the potential dividend among the unsecured creditors, which would be
significantly diminished if the PBGC's claims were treated as secured and had to be paid in full.
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those who provide debtor-in-possession financing,30 and those who purchase the
assets of bankrupt firms unencumbered by pension obligations.31 The biggest
losers are retirees and current employees whose retirement income or
expectations of income are reduced32 and the PBGC.33 Any consideration of the
equities involved in pension plan termination cannot overlook the possibility that
failure to terminate may lead to liquidation of the company. But this risk must be
balanced against the potential for abuse of PBGC insurance by employers. The
recent use of Chapter 11 by employers with large unfunded pension obligations
mimics the use of Bildisco and Chapter 11 by employers with unwanted labor
contracts. As it did after Bildisco, Congress must intervene to prevent the abuse of
Chapter 11 by employers seeking to reorganize.
Part II of this note briefly reviews the form and function of the PBGC. Part Il
introduces several of the aspects of PBGC insurance of single employer plans that
create moral hazard, which causes employers to underfund their pension plans.
Part IV focuses on the dysfunctional relationship between ERISA, the
Bankruptcy Code, and the Tax Code, and the ways in which employers with large
unfunded pensions take advantage of those relationships to avoid pension
liabilities. Finally, Part V discusses previous proposals for change to prevent the
abuse of Chapter 11 by employers who terminate their pension plans after
entering bankruptcy and concludes that-while statutory change is necessary-
amendments to ERISA that protect the PBGC's claim against firms that
underfund their pensions may prove more useful than changes to the Bankruptcy
Code or ERISA that grant the PBGC some sort of priority.
II. FORM AND FUNCTION OF THE PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY
CORPORATION
The PBGC is a govemment-owned corporation 34 created under the
Employee Retirement Security Act (ERISA)3 5 in 1974 for the purpose of insuring
30 The Retirement System of Alabama (RSA), which provided debtor-in-possession (DIP)
financing to U.S. Airways, agreed to invest up to $240 million in the airline for a 37.5%
interest, contingent on the airline receiving a federal loan guarantee from the Air Transport
Stabilization Board (ATSB). See Reeves, supra note 15. Ironically, the ATSB required U.S.
Airways to reduce its pension obligations before receiving the guarantee. While increasing the
value of RSA's investment and mitigating the risk of U.S. Airways default, the ATSB thrust
over $600 million in pension obligations on the PBGC. See Borrus, supra note 13.
31 See supra note 12 (discussing the use of bankruptcy to avoid pension obligations as the
steel industry consolidates).
32 See supra notes 14, 17 and accompanying text.
33 Seesupra note 11.
34 See Keating, supra note 22, at 806 (The PBGC is "a wholly-owned United States
government corporation modeled after the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation."). The board
of directors consists of the Secretaries of the Treasury, Commerce, and Labor. See 29 U.S.C.
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private pension plans.36 The PBGC's mandate is "to encourage the continuation
and maintenance of voluntary private pension plans for the benefit of their
participants, to provide for the timely and uninterrupted payment of pension
benefits" covered under ERISA, and "to maintain premiums... at the lowest
level consistent with carrying out its obligations" under ERISA.37
The PBGC insures only defined benefit pension plans, 38 or plans into which
the employer makes regular contributions with the promise of an annuity upon the
employee's retirement. 39 These plans are distinguishable from defined
contribution plans, such as 401(k)40 plans and employee stock ownership plans
(ESOPs), into which employers and employees make regular contributions, but
the amount received upon retirement depends upon the return on those
contributions. 41 There is no need for government insurance of these plans because
the only obligation assumed by the employer is its share of contributions to the
plan, rather than the promise of an annuity, and this obligation is met when
contributions are made.42 Special exemptions from coverage exist for
§ 1302(d) (2000). In addition, the PBGC has an advisory committee comprised of seven
members recommended by the board and appointed by the President. Id. § 1302(h)(2). This
advisory committee makes recommendations regarding the appointment of trustees in
termination proceedings, the investment of PBGC funds, and other issues related to plan
termination and operation of the PBGC. Id. § 1302(h)(1). The advisory committee membership
is divided among two representatives of labor, two representatives of business, and three
representatives of the general public interest. Id. § 1302(h)(2). See also I MICHAEL J. CANAN,
QUALIFIED RETIREMENT PLANS § 19.1 (2003) (describing generally the PBGC); Jill L. Uylaki,
Note, Promises Made, Promises Broken: Securing Defined Benefit Pension Plan Income in the
Wake of Employer Bankruptcy: Should We Rethink Priority Status for the Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation?, 6 ELDER L.J. 77, 83-90 (1998) (discussing the form and function of
the PBGC).
35 See 29 U.S.C. § 1302 (2000).
36 See RICHARD A. IPPOLITO, THE ECONOMICS OF PENSION INSURANCE 3 (1989) ("The
PBGC ensured that workers would be paid their vested pension benefits on termination of their
pension plan.").
37 29 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(3) (2000).
38 See id § 132 1(a)-(b) (describing the plans to which PBGC insurance applies and those
to which it does not ); id § 1002(2)(A) (defining terms "employee pension benefit plan" and
"pension plan"); 26 U.S.C. § 401 (a) (describing plans that qualify for tax exempt contributions);
see also CANAN supra note 34, § 19.2.
39 See IPPOLITO, supra note 36, at 16 ("A defined benefit pension is a promise by a firm to
pay workers an annuity at retirement age.").
40 See 26 U.S.C. § 401(k) (2000).
41 See IPPPOLITO, supra note 36, at 17 (providing a similar description). For a simple, yet
more detailed, explanation of the differences between defined benefit and defined contribution
plans, see NAT'L EDUC. ASS'N, UNDERSTANDING DEFINED BENEFIT & DEFINED CONTRIBUTION
PENSION PLANS (1995).
42 See Keating, supra note 22, at 806. Keating states:
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professional service providers with fewer than twenty-five employees, 43
churches,44 plans for highly-compensated executives, 45 and all government
plans. 46 Defined benefit plans are divided into single-employer plans,47 provided
voluntarily by an employer, and multi-employer plans, 48 which are plans
provided by several employers under a collective bargaining agreement, 49 and
these plans are insured separately. 50
There is little reason for the federal pension insurance program to cover defined
contribution plans because employers fulfill such funding obligations when they make
contributions. Under defined benefit plans, in contrast, a plan sponsor meets its obligation
when the participant's benefits are paid fully or it purchases an annuity contract on behalf
of the participant.
Id.
Some might question the assumption that defined contribution plans need not be insured,
particularly those at Enron, who lost billions in retirement savings invested in Enron stock. See
Enron Workers Sue to Recover $1 Billion in Lost Pension Funds, 11 ANDREWS' PROF.
LIABILITY LITIG. REP. 3 (2002). However, under ERISA, the employer serves as a trustee over
the pension plan, creating at least a civil remedy against an employer who misappropriates plan
funds or deceives employees into buying inflated shares of company stock. See id; 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1101-1109 (2000); CANAN, supra note 34, § 16.9.
43 See 29 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(13), (c)(2)(A) (2000).
44 See id. § 132 1(b)(3) (2000).
45 See id § 1321(b)(6) (2000).
46 See id § 1321 (b)(2) (2000) (including federal, state, and local).
47 See CANAN, supra note 34, § 19.1 ("A single-employer plan is any defined benefit
plan.., which is not a multi-employer plan.... A single-employer plan can be sponsored by
more than one employer in the same controlled group or by employers not otherwise related to
each other.").
4 8 See CANAN, supra note 34, § 19.1. Canan describes:
A multi[-]employer plan means a plan (i) to which more than one employer is
required to contribute, (ii) maintained pursuant to one or more collective bargaining
agreements between one or more employee organizations and more than one employer,
and (iii) which satisfies such other requirements as the Secretary of Labor may prescribe
by regulation.
Id.
49 See 29 U.S.C. § 1322(a) (2000) (guarantee of single-employer plans); § 1322a(a)
(guarantee of multi-employer plans); Uylaki, supra note 34, at 87-88 (distinguishing between
single-employer and multi-employer plans).
50 There are two separate funds established for each type of plan. See 29 U.S.C. § 1305(a)
(2000); CANAN, supra note 34, § 19.4. Historically the single-employer fund has been the
victim of underfunding and economic downturn, but in 2002 the multi-employer fund reported
a negative net position for the first time in twenty years. See 2003 PBGC ANN. REP. 5 (2004).
The net position of a fund is the amount by which liabilities exceed assets. By comparison, at
the close of fiscal year 2002, the negative net position of the single-employer fund was $11.2
billion, while the negative net position of the multi-employer fund was $261 million. Id at 23,
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The PBGC generates revenue through the payment of premiums, which are
set by statute.51 The PBGC is wholly self-sustaining, receiving no contributions
from general revenues.52 The benefits guaranteed by the PBGC are also limited
by statute.53 To qualify as a guaranteed benefit under a single-employer plan, the
benefit must be a non-forfeitable pension benefit to which the participant or
beneficiary is entitled and be payable directly or indirectly to a living person. 54
The single-employer benefit guaranteed by the PBGC is a straight life annuity,
commencing at age sixty-five and payable monthly.55 The actual monthly amount
33 n.7. This Note focuses on the use of Chapter 11 by those with single-employer plans to
evade pension obligations.
51 See 29 U.S.C. § 1306(a)(3)(A)-(E) (2000). The premiums for single-employer plans are
capped at $19 per participant, plus an additional premium of $9 for each $1,000 of unfunded
vested benefits under the plan divided by the number of participants. Id. § 1306(a)(3)(A)(i),
(E)(i)-(ii). For a more detailed description of the way in which premiums are calculated, see
CANAN, supra note 34, § 19.5 (single-employer). The contribution this statutory premium
structure makes to the general moral hazard created by PBGC insurance is discussed infra Part
lII.B.
52 See Uylaki, supra note 34, at 88 ("Unlike the archetypal federal agency, the [PBGC]
receives no funding from general tax revenues."). Uylaki states that because the PBGC receives
no funding from general revenues "the taxpayer need not lament that the PBGC will dip into
taxpayer coffers in order to resuscitate failed pension plans." Id. This statement is not entirely
accurate. The PBGC has a put option that authorizes it to place up to $100 million in notes with
the Secretary of the Treasury. See 29 U.S.C. § 1305(c) (2000); CANAN, supra note 34, § 19.1
("The borrowing is to be used, if necessary, to fund employee benefits guaranteed by the
PBGC."). And while the PBGC may not use general revenues to bail out failed pension plans,
this does not mean that general revenues may not prove necessary to bail out the PBGC, despite
the fact that the government is not technically liable for any of the PBGC's obligations. Cf id
§ 19.3(A); Kudlow & Cramer: Bradley Belt, Executive Director of Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation, Discusses the Airlines' Pension Problems (CNBC television broadcast, Aug. 31,
2004) (Mr. Belt states that "there is some risk if we don't address [the termination of
underfunded pensions] that the American taxpayer is going to be called upon to bail out the
pension insurance system"); see also Elliott, supra note 16, at 8, (estimating that the bailout
could be in excess of $67 billion).
53 See 29 U.S.C. § 1322 (single-employer) (2000).
54 See CANAN, supra note 34, § 19.6(A)(1). To qualify as a pension, the benefit must
generally be payable as an annuity. Id. Non-forfeitability generally means that the accrued
benefits will vest fully upon termination of the plan. Id. The beneficiary is entitled to the benefit
if he or she is receiving benefits when the plan terminates or would have received the benefit at
retirement. Id. Finally, "[t]he benefit must be payable to a natural person, or to a trust or estate
for the benefit of one or more natural persons." Id. See also 29 C.F.R. § 4022.1 to .7 (2003).
55 See 29 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(3) (2000); CANAN, supra note 34, § 19.6(A)(2). The PBGC
defines a straight life annuity as "a series of level periodic payments payable for the life of the
recipient, but does not include any combined annuity form, including an annuity payable for a
term certain and life." 29 C.F.R. § 4022.2 (2004). A straight life annuity is "the original and
basic type of annuity." JEROME B. COHEN & ARTHUR W. HANSON, PERSONAL FINANCE:
PRINCIPLES AND CASE PROBLEMS 478 (1972). Traditionally such an annuity is purchased for a
lump-sum premium and payments begin immediately. Id. The annuity itself has no cash value
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paid to a beneficiary by the PBGC is the lesser of either one-twelfth the
beneficiary's annual salary over the five-year period during which he or she
earned the most 56 or a fixed amount indexed to changes in the cost of living.57 In
2004 the guaranteed maximum annual amount paid out by the PBGC will be
$44,386.32, or $3,698.86 per month.58
The PBGC is obligated to pay benefits to retirees when an underfunded
pension plan is terminated. 59 There are three means by which a plan is
terminated: (1) standard tenmination, (2) distress termination by the plan provider,
or (3) involuntary termination by the PBGC. Under a standard termination the
plan is terminated by the employer and plan assets are distributed.60 A standard
termination is most likely to occur where the assets of the pension plan exceed the
plan's obligations and, by terminating the plan, the employer can capture that
surplus for itself.61 A standard termination could occur during the course of a
and, as a result, payments cease upon the death of the annuitant regardless of when he or she
dies. Id. Multi-employer plans are outside the scope of this Note. For a discussion of the
benefits guaranteed under such plans see CANAN, supra note 34, § 19.16.
56 See 29 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(3XA) (2000); CANAN, supra note 34, § 19.6(A)(2)(i).
57 See 29 U.S.C. § 1322(bX3XB) (2000); CANAN, supra note 34, § 19.6(A)(2)(ii). The
amount an employee can receive from the PBGC cannot exceed "the actuarial value of a
monthly benefit in the form of a life annuity commencing at age 65." 29 U.S.C. § 1322b(a)
(2000).
58 See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., Fact Sheets: PBGC's Pension Guarantees, at
http://www.pbgc.gov /publications/factshts/GUARFACT.HTM (last visited Nov. 10, 2004)
[hereinafter PBGC's Pension Guarantees]. The benefits of those who retire before age 65 are
reduced along a fixed scale. See 29 C.F.R. § 4022.23(c) (2003). "For example, the maximum
guarantee for a participant who retires at age 62 is $35,065.20 yearly ($2,922.10 monthly) for a
single-life annuity. At age 55, the maximum guarantee is $19,973.88 yearly ($1,664.49
monthly)." PBGC's Pension Guarantees, supra. Benefits are also reduced if the annuity is a
joint and survivor annuity. See 29 C.F.R. § 4022.23(d)(2)-(3) (2003).
59 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1302(aX2), 1322(a) (2000).
60 When a plan that is fully funded is terminated, the plan sponsor must purchase annuities
to cover those entitled to benefits under the terminated plan. See 29 U.S.C. § 1341(b)(3)(A)
(2000); 29 C.F.R. § 4041.28 (2003); EDWARD THOMAS VEAL & EDWARD R. MACKIEWICZ,
PENSION PLAN TERMINATIONS § 6.1 (1989).
61 See Su-Jane Hsieh, Kenneth R. Ferris & Andrew H. Chen, Evidence on the Timing and
Determinants of Overfunded Pension Plan Termination, 8 REv. QUANTITATIVE FIN. & ACCT.
129 (1997) (evaluating the factors affecting the decision to terminate an overfunded pension
plan); Regina T. Jefferson, Defined Benefit Plan Funding: How Much Is Too Much?, 44 CASE
W. RES. L. REv. 1 (1993) (describing legislative efforts to control overfunding for tax purposes
and subsequent reversion of the plan surplus to the employer). These terminations can be highly
beneficial to the employer. For instance, in 1985 Union Carbide extracted over $500 million
from its terminated pension plan. Id. at 136. Ironically, United Airlines terminated its pension
plan in 1985 and reaped a $254 million windfall. See KAREN FERGUSON & KATE BLACKWELL,
PENSIONS IN CRISIS: WHY THE SYSTEM IS FAILING AMERICA AND How YOU CAN PROTECT
YOUR FUrURE 127 (1995). United is now threatening to terminate its pension plans with
unfunded liabilities of $6.4 billion. See supra note 13.
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Chapter 11 reorganization if the employer has over-funded the plan and the
surplus could be used to help fund the reorganization plan. Yet, even in the event
of a Chapter 11 filing, neither employees nor the PBGC is harmed by a standard
termination.62
Distress termination occurs where the employer seeks to voluntarily
terminate an underfunded pension plan. 63 In order to voluntarily terminate a plan
as a distress termination, the employer must meet one of four distress criteria.64
These criteria are met where: (1) the employer seeks to terminate during the
course of business liquidation under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code or similar
state law;65 (2) the business shows that continuing to fund a pension plan will
prevent successful reorganization under Chapter 11;66 (3) funding the pension
plan will prevent the firm from paying its debts as they come due;67 or (4) the
plan must be terminated to avoid unreasonably burdensome pension costs caused
by a decline in the number of plan participants. 68 After the PBGC determines that
one of the distress criteria has been met, the PBGC assumes the plan and its assets
and liabilities. 69
Finally, the PBGC itself may initiate an involuntary termination proceeding
against an underfunded plan when it determines that: (1) the plan is not meeting
the minimum funding standard established under the tax code; 70 (2) the plan will
62 If a plan is terminated under a standard termination, ERISA requires that "when the
final distribution of assets occurs, the plan is sufficient for benefit liabilities." 29 U.S.C.
§ 1341(b)(1)(D) (2000). See also 29 C.F.R. § 4041.28(b) (2003) ("If, at the time of any
distribution, the plan administrator determines that plan assets are not sufficient to satisfy all
plan benefits..., the plan administrator may not make any further distribution of assets to
effect the plan's termination and must promptly notify the PBGC."); Keating, supra note 22, at
808 ("A standard termination does not implicate the PBGC's insurance function.").
63 See Keating, supra note 22, at 808 ("A distress termination ... is a voluntary
termination in which an employer with an underfunded pension plan can demonstrate to the
PBGC that it is in financial distress."). For a detailed description of the process of distress
termination see CANAN, supra note 34, § 19.10.
64 See 29 U.S.C. § 134 1(c)(2)(B) (2000).
65 See id § 1341(c)(2)(B)(i); 29 C.F.R. § 4041.41(c)(1) (2003).
66 See 29 U.S.C. § 1341(c)(2)(B)(ii) (2000); 29 C.F.R. § 4041.41(c)(2) (2003).
67 See 29 U.S.C. § 1341(c)(2)(B)(iii)(I) (2000); 29 C.F.R. § 4041.41(c)(3) (2003).
68 See 29 U.S.C. § 1341(c)(2)(B)(iii)(I1) (2000). See also 29 C.F.R. § 4041.41(c)(4)
(2003).
69 See 29 U.S.C. § 134 1(c)(3)(B)(iii) (2000). The employer or a parent corporation incurs
liability for the amount of the unfunded benefit liabilities and unpaid minimum funding
contributions at this point. See 29 U.S.C. § 1362 (2000). The nature of this liability is discussed
infra notes 156-64 and accompanying text.
70 See 29 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1) (2000). The minimum funding standard is discussed in
detail infra notes 134-40 and accompanying text.
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be unable to pay benefits when due;71 (3) certain events have occurred that must
be reported to the PBGC;72 or (4) the long-run loss to the PBGC will "increase
unreasonably" if the plan is not terminated.73 A trustee is then appointed to
administer the plan74 and the PBGC seeks a decree from a U.S. District Court to
terminate the plan and assume its assets and liabilities.75
III. MORAL HAZARD IMPLICIT IN THE ERISA INSURANCE SCHEME
The pension termination insurance system established in ERISA creates what
economists and those in the insurance industry call "moral hazard." 76 A moral
hazard arises when the risk of one party's conduct is removed to a second party,
leading the first party to engage in riskier conduct than he might otherwise engage
in. 7 7 By its very nature, insurance creates moral hazard by enabling the insured to
engage in conduct that tends to lead to insured-against events to a greater degree
than they might otherwise if they bore the full cost of their actions. But the
insurance scheme created under ERISA exacerbates this natural tendency by
encouraging employers to allocate resources away from pension obligations,
charging premiums below market rates that displace a disproportionate amount of
risk away from employers and onto the PBGC, and by encouraging poorly
perforing firms to distribute assets to shareholders and then seek bankruptcy
protection. 78
71 See id § 1342(a)(2). The PBGC must terminate a plan that "does not have assets
available to pay benefits which are currently due under the terms of the plan." Id § 1342(a).
72 See id. §§ 1342(a)(3), 1343.
73 See id § 1342(a)(4). For more detail on involuntary termination see CANAN supra note
34, § 19.11.
74 29 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(1).
75 See id § 1342(c).
76 See IPPOLITO, supra note 36, at 41 ("The policies pursued at the PBGC represent
serious violations of fundamental insurance principles. The pricing system makes no attempt to
require insureds to face the cost of the insurance, and moral hazard is seemingly encouraged.").
77 See Daniel Keating, Pension Insurance, Bankruptcy and Moral Hazard, 1991 Wis. L.
REV. 65, 68 (1991) ("[T]hose who are insured against certain risks have an incentive to use less
than optimal care to avoid those risks."); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
121 (5th ed. 1998) (defining "moral hazard" as "[t]he tendency of an insured to relax his efforts
to prevent the occurrence of the risk that he has insured against because he has shifted the risk
to an insurance company").
78 See generally DAN M. McGILL, GUARANTY FUND FOR PRIVATE PENSION OBLIGATIONS
50-52 (1970) (discussing possibilities for abuse of guaranty system that allows firms to
terminate plans without also being required to terminate); IPPOLITO, supra note 36, passim;
Keating, supra note 77, at 67-68.
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A. Employers'Reallocation of Resources
Pension insurance allows employers to reallocate resources away from labor
costs and toward capital spending or shareholders. Keating describes this
behavior as "[e]mployers, realizing that the PBGC's insurance can subsidize their
company's pension promises for an expected cost to the company of less than one
hundred cents on the dollar, [giving employers] an incentive to spend capital in
ways other than funding pension plans."79 Employers pan spend this capital by
either investing in new technology or ventures,80 or returning the savings
captured to shareholders. These savings are generated in an overlapping process.
Employers first use the promise of a defined benefit pension to replace a portion
of employees' current wages.81 If the employer actually makes sufficient
contributions into the plan to fund those promises, those contributions will be less
than what the employer would have to pay to replace the pension-portion of a
labor agreement with current wages because of the time value of money.82 If the
employer fails to make sufficient contributions it simply saves even more on labor
costs. 83 Employees are lulled into accepting the promised pension as part of their
benefits package, in part because of the promise of govenmment insurance. 84
79 Keating, supra note 77, at 67.
80 See Keating, supra note 77, at 76-77.
An employer, by underfunding its pension plan, can use the money saved to engage
in speculative enterprises. If the risk-taking pays off, the upside potential for the
stockholders and senior managers is theoretically unlimited. If the risky ventures fail, the
worst that can happen is that the corporation liquidates and the underfunded pension plan
terminates.
Id.
81 See Statement of Steven A. Kandarian, supra note 6, at 8.
Pension insurance creates moral hazard, tempting management and labor at financially
troubled companies to make promises that they cannot or will not fund. The cost of wage
increases is immediate, while the cost of pension increases can be deferred for up to 30
years .... In exchange for smaller wage increases today, companies often offer more
generous pension benefits tomorrow, knowing that if the company fails the plan will be
handed over to the PBGC. This unfairly shifts the cost of unfunded pension promises to
responsible companies and their workers.
Id.
82 See Keating, supra note 77, at 72 ("By offering insured pension benefits to their
employees, businesses are able to devote fewer resources to current wages.").
83 Although pensions are subject to minimum funding requirements, these requirements
can be waived for three years by the IRS. See 26 U.S.C. § 412(d) (2000). This waiver is
discussed at length infra Part IV.A.
84 Cf Keating, supra note 77, at 73 ("Employers could... promise pensions that are not
guaranteed by the PBGC. Such uninsured pension obligations would not, however, be as
attractive to employees as pension promises.., backed by the PBGC. Thus, the PBGC's
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Second, while saving on labor costs by deferring wages, firms can use overly-
optimistic projections of the return on the plan's assets to reduce the amount
contributed to the plan during the current period.85 The result is that the employer
can use the cash that would otherwise go to pay wages for fixed investment or to
pay dividends, transferring the risk of that fixed investment to employees and the
PBGC 86 or enriching shareholders at the expense of employees and the PBGC.87
insurance function adds value to the pension promises made by employers .... ); see also id. at
75 ("As a result of federal pension insurance, employees lack the proper incentives to monitor
their employers' funding levels because the employees will not bear the full costs of their
inattention. Instead, that cost will be bome, initially, and in many cases ultimately, by the
[PBGC]"); JAMES H. SMALHOUT, THE UNCERTAIN RETIREMENT 20 (1996) ("[W]orkers place
much greater faith in otherwise hollow pension promises when the U.S. Treasury stands behind
them.").
85 See Keating, supra note 77, at 73-74.
Although there are federal minimum funding standards for insured pension plans, the
employer retains a tremendous amount of discretion as to the level of funding that each
plan will have. There are... a number of actuarial assumptions that need to be made in
order to determine whether employers are complying with minimum funding standards.
Although these assumptions must be "reasonable," there is nevertheless a significant range
within which employers can accommodate their own preferences on funding.
Id.
Employers may also be encouraged to use aggressive estimates of the return on plan assets
because accounting rules allow the firm to use these estimates when reporting plan income. See
James M. Lukenda & Kimberly A. Wittrock, Underfunded Pension Plans: A Looming Crisis
for Corporate America?, 2003 Am. BANKR. INST. J. 20, 20 (Feb. 2003) (discussing Statement
of Financial Accounting Standards No. 87, which allows companies "to include assumed
returns on pension fund investments and the interest expense on the deferred benefits as
elements of pension expense/income"); Revell, supra note 27, at 102 ("For accounting purposes
it's not the actual return on plan assets that counts most. What really matters is the expected
(read: 'imaginary') return that management assumes it can generate."). Cf CANAN, supra note
34, § 12.3(A)(1).
[T]he actuary cannot vary the benefits which will ultimately be owed to participants and
therefore the ultimate cost of the plans. However, he or she can substantially alter the
amount of contribution which might be due in any given plan year, making more or less
due in Year I vs. Year 10 or Year 15 of the plan, simply by a choice of different actuarial
assumptions or method.... If the plan is being established during lean profit years, the
employer will likely want to defer contributions as long as possible.
Id.
86 See David F. Bean & Richard A. Bemardi, Underfunding Pension Obligations While
Paying Dividends: Evidence of Risk Transfers, 11 CRIT. PERSP. ON Accr. 515, 518 (2000)
("The economic and legal reality of the decision to underfund pensions is that management can,
and does, unilaterally impose a creditor status on employees/retirees.... External financing
involves administrative, underwriting, and other costs .... [and therefore] internal sources are
favored over external sources .... ). See also Keating, supra note 77, at 77 ("When a company
underfunds its pension plan, the firm is in effect 'borrowing' money from the PBGC on an
unsecured basis similar to a firm's drawing down an unsecured line of credit.").
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The plan retains a lien against the employer when the minimum funding standard
is not met,88 and the PBGC theoretically receives a lien against the employer
when the plan is terminated.89 However, these liens prove to be of little value
when the employer seeks to reorganize under Chapter 11 because the plan simply
becomes another creditor and the PBGC often cannot perfect its lien.90
B. Premiums Unrelated to Risk
Premiums paid to the PBGC to fund the insurance program are set by
Congress at a fixed amount per plan participant.91 These premiums are adjusted
to account for the amount by which a plan is underfunded, but do not in any way
87 See Bean & Bernard, supra note 86, at 520.
The payment of dividends in the context of increasing pension liabilities suggests that the
firm considers the fiduciary obligation to its shareholders to be of paramount
importance .... However, if employees perceive that pension funding is not problematic
due to eventual payment by the PBGC, there is no factual basis to assume deterioration in
management's fiduciary obligations to its employees.... However, if all or a portion of a
pension plan is ultimately funded by the PBGC then the recipients do incur risks in terms
of expectations versus actual disbursements as well as in terms of both time and money.
Thus the underfunding of pension plans is a unilateral and uncompensated transfer of risk.
Furthermore, the shareholders of the firm become defacto recipients of wealth transfers
via the discretionary payments made to shareholders versus the discretionary payments
made to the pension plan.
Id.
Of even greater concern is the finding by Bean and Bemardi that firms with increasing
pension liabilities showed declining cash flows yet higher dividends. Id at 527. This suggests
that these firms may be diverting corporate resources from pension contributions to
shareholders. Such conduct is to be expected where the value of the firm is less than the present
value of the cash shareholders can squeeze out of the firm. See George A. Akerlof & Paul M.
Romer, Looting: The Economic Underworld of Bankruptcy for Profit, 1993 BROOKINGS
PAPERS ON ECON. Acnvrry 1, 6 (1993).
88 See 26 U.S.C. § 412(n) (2000).
89 See 29 U.S.C. § 1362(b) (2000).
90 See II U.S.C. § 545(a) (2000). The conflict between ERISA and this section of the
Bankruptcy Code is discussed further infra Parts IV, V.
91 See 29 U.S.C. § 1306(a)(3) (2000); Uylaki, supra note 34, at 88; Keating, supra note
77, at 97. Keating notes:
[T]he formula which drives the variable rate premiums looks solely to differences in the
amount of underfunding among plans. The formula does not attempt to factor in the reality
that two plans, equally underfunded, might pose greatly different risks to the PBGC based
on the relative likelihood that the PBGC will be forced to assume responsibility for the
plans.
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reflect the risk of plan termination.92 The result is that premiums do not reflect the
risk assumed by the PBGC or displaced by employers;93 the PBGC provides
maximum (statutory) coverage for nominal premiums. Premiums unrelated to the
risk assumed by the insurer disproportionately shift the risk related to the insured-
against event (in this case, termination) from the insured to the insurer.94 Where
the costs of engaging in behavior that increases the risk of the insured-against
event are below what the market would require to insure against the risk of such
92 See Richard A. Ippolito & Steven Boyce, The Cost of Pension Insurance, 69 J. RISK &
INS. 121, 124 (2002) ("[T]he pricing schedule currently enforced by the PBGC only vaguely
resembles one that meets a market standard.... [T]he overall premiums now collected amount
to about 50 percent of those that would be charged in the private sector for the same
coverage."). Ippolito and Boyce also estimate that the current premium structure amounts to
$4.60 per $1,000 of exposure to liability from termination, while premiums determined in the
market would be about $24.60 per $1,000 of exposure. Id. at 153. That is, PBGC premiums are
about 20% of what the market would charge to insure the same obligations insured by the
PBGC. See also 29 U.S.C. § 1306(a)(3)(E).
As an indication of just how bizarre the premium structure is, the PBGC has revealed that
United has paid only about $50 million in total premiums since ERISA was enacted in 1974,
while it will likely saddle the PBGC with $6.4 billion in obligations. See Boselovic, supra note
13; John Plender, A Slow Motion Re-Run of the S&L Disaster: Stand By for Pension Bail-Out,
FIN. TImEs, Sept. 13, 2004, at 24.
93 Keating points out that "the PBGC has found it difficult to assess the risk that a given
plan will terminate." Keating, supra note 77, at 97. Yet Ippolito and Boyce, both of whom have
worked for or work at the PBGC, have shown that the market risk can be priced. See Ippolito &
Boyce, supra note 92. Current director of the PBGC, Bradley D. Belt, has announced his
commitment to imposing risk-based premiums on plans covered by the PBGC. See Vineeta
Anand, Ready To Work: New PBGC Head Set to Fix System, PENsIONs & INVEsTMENTS, May
17, 2004, at 2.
For now, Mr. Belt's basic premise... is that the PBGC must be allowed to function
like any other private insurance company. To that end, it should charge varying premiums
depending on the risks plan sponsors present to the agency, measured by the companies'
credit ratings, asset allocation of the pension plans, exposure to interest rate changes and
structural risk in a particular industry sector.
Id.
94 See Su-Jane Hsieh, Andrew H. Chen & Kenneth R. Ferris, The Valuation of PBGC
Insurance Premiums Using an Option Pricing Model, 29 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
89, 90 (1994).
[B]y purchasing pension insurance, plan sponsors effectively acquire pension put options
written by the PBGC. If the pension insurance is correctly priced, no wealth transfers
should occur between the PBGC and plan sponsors in the event of finding level or
pension asset mix changes. On the other hand, if the premiums are not correctly priced,
changes in plan funding levels or the pension asset investment strategy could be
undertaken by plan sponsors to increase the PBGC insurance put option values.
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an event, the insured party is more likely to engage in such conduct (e.g.,
underfunding). 95
C. Bankruptcy for Profit
While government insurance of private obligations may be necessary in
markets where private insurers are simply incapable of providing coverage, there
may be situations where government insurance of business obligations creates an
incentive to divert assets away from those obligations for a period and then
default on those obligations and seek bankruptcy protection, or to file
"bankruptcy for profit."9 6
The incentive to engage in high-risk behavior to maximize short-term returns
to equity holders that arises out of government insurance and the destructive
results that follow was best illustrated by the collapse of the Savings and Loan
(S&L) industry in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 97 Beginning in 1980 the
95 See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
96 Akerlof and Romer describe this type of conduct as "bankruptcy for profit," or
"looting." Such conduct will arise where "poor accounting, lax regulation, or low penalties for
abuse give owners an incentive to pay themselves more than their firms are worth and then
default on their debt obligations." Akerlof & Romer, supra note 87, at 2. Akerlof and Romer
note that "[b]ankruptcy for profit occurs most commonly when a government guarantees a
firm's debt obligations," specifically noting the insurance of pension obligations as such a
guarantee. Id. Where the government's requirements of the insured with regard to the insured-
against event (e.g., minimum funding requirements) are below the benefit to owners of
depleting the firm of resources (e.g., paying dividends), the firm will have an incentive to
distribute assets toward owners and default. Id. In such a situation,
the normal economics of maximizing economic value is replaced by the topsy-turvy
economics of extractable value .... Once owners have decided that they can extract more
from a firm by maximizing their present take, any action that allows them to extract more
currently will be attractive--even if it causes a large reduction in the true economic net
worth of the firm.
Id.
9 7 See generally Elijah Brewer III & Thomas H. Mondschean, Ex Ante Risk and Ex Post
Collapse of S&Ls in the 1980s, J. ECON. PERSP., July 1992, at 2 (showing that most highly
leveraged S&Ls engaged in riskiest investment strategies and had higher relative stock prices
before the S&L collapse); Bert Ely, Regulatory Moral Hazard: The Real Moral Hazard in
Federal Deposit Insurance, 4 INDEP. REv. 241 (1999) (concluding that regulatory "laxity" is the
true cause of the moral hazard attending depository insurance); Daniel M. Gropper & T.
Randolph Beard, Insolvency, Moral Hazard and Expense Preference Behavior: Evidence from
US Savings and Loan Associations, 16 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 607 (1995) (assessing
the tendency among insured S&Ls to allocate assets toward wages, salaries, and fringe benefits
as insolvency approached); Dale K. Osborne & Seokwon Lee, Effects of Deposit Insurance
Reform on Moral Hazard in US Banking, 28 J. Bus. FIN. & Accr. 979 (2001) (assessing the
change in bank lending habits in response to regulatory change in depository insurance,
including higher premiums, intended to reduced moral hazard accompanying such insurance);
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Federal government insured deposits at S&Ls through the Federal Savings and
Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC).98 In addition, S&Ls were regulated by the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB). 99 After phenomenal growth and
success throughout the 1960s, S&Ls came under pressure as interest rates rose
along with inflation in the 1970s.100 With the promise of government insurance
backing deposits, and with the imprimatur of Congress, S&Ls began investing in
high-income, high-risk assets to cover losses. °10 Ultimately the S&L industry
collapsed, costing taxpayers over $186 billion as the government intervened to
resolve the liabilities of insolvent S&Ls.102 At least one study by Brewer and
Mondschean shows that during the 1980s, the most highly leveraged S&Ls
engaged in the riskiest investment strategies and had significantly higher stock
prices relative to assets than S&Ls that were less leveraged and did not engage in
similarly risky investment strategies. 10 3 In the absence of depository insurance,
the ability of shareholders to engage in risky investment strategies is limited by
the imposition of "market discipline" on those investments by depositors.'14 With
deposit insurance, however, this market restraint falls away.'0 5 Shareholders at
S&Ls were free to engage in high-risk investment strategies, which resulted in
David C. Wheelock & Subal C. Kumbhakar, Which Banks Choose Deposit Insurance?
Evidence of Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in a Voluntary Insurance System, 27 J.
MONEY, CREDrr & BANKrNG 186 (1995) (concluding that it is the weakest banks that seek out
depository insurance when it is not mandated by law and that such insurance promotes riskier
practices).
However, perverse incentives arise from other government programs as well, such as
programs through which the government serves as a "lender of last resort." See Eddy L. LaDue,
Moral Hazard in Federal Farm Lending, 72 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 784 (1990). Professor LaDue
argues that a government program providing below-market loans to farmers when those
farmers generate insufficient cash flow to service debt at market rates provides an incentive to
avoid increasing cash flow, spend more on personal items, and avoid capital investment. See id
at 776.
98 See Brewer & Mondschean, supra note 97, at 2.
99 1d. at4.
100 Id. S&Ls essentially provided fixed-rate long-term home mortgages funded through
short-term deposits earning interest. Id. As long as short-term rates remained below the rate of
return on the mortgages, S&Ls remained profitable. Id. However, as short-term rates increased
during the 1970s, profits at S&Ls were squeezed and generally eliminated. Id. In addition, the
amount of interest S&Ls could pay on deposits was limited by federal law, causing deposit
outflows at S&Ls. Id. To avert disaster, Congress lowered capital requirements, freeing up
assets, and allowed S&Ls to expand the pool of assets in which they could invest to include
much riskier assets. Id.
101 See id at 4; Akerlof& Romer, supra note 87, at 23-36.
102 Brewer & Mondschean, supra note 97, at 2.
103 See idat 9--10.
104 1d at6.
105 Id.
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temporary increases in share prices. 106 Thus, "it was moral hazard... that led to
the S&L crisis and increased its cost. ' 107 The ability of pension plan sponsors to
engage in similar behavior as a result of the insurance provided by the PBGC is
eerily reminiscent of the federal government's experience with S&Ls and
depository insurance. 108
Consider the case of a highly leveraged firm with union contracts calling for
the maintenance of a defined-benefit pension plan.' 09 Because the firm has few
unencumbered assets, its liquidation value to the shareholders is low, possibly
zero. Yet, the firm pays dividends during periods of profitability, or even during a
period of unprofitability. 0 The firm is required by law to pay premiums to the
government to insure the pension plan."' The firm must meet the minimum
106Id at 10.
107 Id.
108 The financial status of the PBGC and the potential liability to taxpayers is
distinguishable from the S&L scandal in at least one regard. As Bradley Belt points out, unlike
the S&Ls that collapsed, the PBGC does not face an immediate liquidity crisis. See Weekend
All Things Considered- Bradley Belt Discusses Companies Defaulting on Their Pension
Contributions (NPR radio broadcast, Aug. 28, 2004). Belt stated:
[The S&L crisis] was a cash crisis .... It had to be addressed because people wanted their
deposits form those thrifts. That's not the same issue here. PBGC has $40 billion in
assets.... The problem is we've got a deep hole, $10 billion deficit, huge contingent
liability.. . and no real ability to fill that hole. That raises the prospect of a future taxpayer
bailout ....
Id. Nevertheless, there are other similarities, particularly Congress' response to both problems.
Indeed, instead of tightening minimum funding standards or adjusting the premium structure to
prevent underfunding, Congress has instead effectively reduced the amount of assets flowing
into pension plans during 2004 and 2005 by altering the interest rate benchmark imposed on
plan administrators, just as Congress reduced capital requirements imposed on S&Ls
immediately before the collapse of that industry. See infra note 140.
109 This analysis is consistent with Cooper and Ross, who argue that pension
underfunding will arise in situations where capital market inefficiencies leave the employer
undercapitalized. See Russell W. Cooper & Thomas W. Ross, Pensions: Theories of
Underfunding, 8 LAB. ECON. 667, 683 (2002); Russell W. Cooper & Thomas W. Ross,
Protecting Underfunded Pensions: The Role of Guarantee Funds, 2 J. PENSION ECON. & FIN.
247, 255 (2002) [hereinafter Cooper & Ross, Protecting]. According to Cooper and Ross, "a
firm with sufficiently large ... capitalization will offer.., a fully funded pension, efficient risk
sharing and efficient decision on continuation. In contrast, a firm with small [capitalization] will
underfund its pension... and will exit too often relative to the socially efficient decision." Id. at
256.
110 According to Bean and Bemardi, United Airlines borrowed to pay dividends during
the 1990s. See Bean & Bemardi, supra note 86, at 517. This may have been a consequence of
United being majority-owned by its own employees.
I II See 29 U.S.C. § 1321(a) (2000).
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funding standard to avoid penalties 12 and termination of the pension plan. 1 3 The
firm may use "reasonable" estimates of the return on plan assets to determine the
amount it must contribute to meet the minimum funding standard. 114 Any firm
has an incentive to use aggressive estimates of the return on plan assets to make
the smallest possible contribution to the plan to meet the minimum funding
standard" l 5 The risk that this contribution may not actually be enough to cover
future payments to retirees is borne by the insuring government agency, so even a
solvent firm has an incentive to use aggressive estimates. However, this
hypothetical firm, being barely solvent, has an even greater incentive to make the
smallest possible contributions allowed by law to its pension plan and to
redistribute the cash not placed in its plan to shareholders. 1 6 Shareholders will
seek to maximize dividends to extract as much value as possible from the firm in
the short term, knowing that liquidation would leave them with next to
nothing.11 7 The result is the reallocation of cash away from the insured pension
plan and into the hands of shareholders, followed by a Chapter 11 filing. If the
firm can then avoid its unfunded pension obligations by terminating its plan, the
process can be repeated with a new set of shareholders, namely former
creditors. 18 If not, the firm's bankruptcy case is converted to Chapter 7' 19 and
112 See infra notes 123-132 and accompanying text (discussing minimum funding
standard). The plan itself receives a lien against the employer in the amount by which the plan
is underfunded. See 26 U.S.C. § 412(n) (2000). In addition, an excise tax often percent on the
accumulated deficiency is assessed against the employer. See 26 U.S.C. § 497 1(a) (2000). If the
employer fails to make up this shortfall within a "correction period" an excise tax of one-
hundred percent of the shortfall is assessed. See 26 U.S.C. § 4971(b) (2000); CANAN, supra
note 34, § 12.8(C)(2). This tax is discussed infra note 144--46 and accompanying text.
113 See 29 U.S.C. § 1307(a) (2000).
114 See 26 U.S.C. § 412(c)(3) (2000).
115 See supra Part III.A (discussing the incentives employers have to reallocate resources
away from pension obligations).
116 "A dollar in increased dividends today is worth a dollar to owners, but a dollar in
increased future earnings of the firm is worth nothing because future payments accrue to the
creditors who will be left holding the bag." Akerlof & Romer, supra note 87, at 2.
117 Akerlof and Romer describe this activity in a series of inequalities. If V equals the true
value or net worth of a corporation and M equals the government restriction on the use of the
corporations assets (i.e., the minimum funding contribution) then: (a) where M > V there is an
incentive to "borrow" enough fiom the government to pay owners M and then default; and (b)
where M< Vthere is an incentive to maximize V. Akerlof & Romer, supra note 87, at 6.
118 Keating's proposed "super-priority," discussed infra Part V.A, rests upon the
presumption that imposing a blanket lien on the assets of the firm in favor of the PBGC upon
termination of the plan would give creditors incentive to monitor the employer's funding of
these plans. See Keating, supra note 77, at 102-03. The reasonable inference to be drawn is that
secured creditors are indifferent toward pension plan underfunding because they know that their
claims will not be affected by the PBGC's claim for unfunded benefits. Yet there is some
evidence that pension plan underfunding decreases a firm's debt ratings. See Thomas J. Carroll
& Greg Niehaus, Pension Funding and Corporate Debt Ratings, 65 J. RISK & INS. 427, 439
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the firm is liquidated. 120 This process of reallocation may explain, in part,
evidence indicating that firms increase interest rate assumptions on pension plan
assets in the years leading up to termination. 121
The moral hazard created by government insurance of private pension plans
is expressed as an incentive on the part of the employer to underfund its pension
plan. The tangled web of code that governs the maintenance of defined-benefit
pension plans, contributions to those funds, and how those plans are dealt with in
bankruptcy allows firms that succumb to this moral hazard to abuse the
bankruptcy code and shift the costs of reorganization onto employees.
V. THE DYSFUNCTIONAL RELATIONSHIP AMONG THE BANKRUPTCY CODE,
TAx CODE, AND ERISA
Outside of bankruptcy, defined benefit pension plans are governed generally
by the Tax Code 122 and ERISA.123 The Tax Code describes which plans will
qualify for the tax advantages provided to employers who make contributions to
retirement plans, 124 minimum participation, vesting and funding standards, 125
limitations on contributions and benefits, 126 and other criteria. 127 ERISA
prescribes mechanisms intended to protect pensions and establishes reporting
requirements plan administrators must meet, 128 as well as defining participation
and vesting standards,129 the fiduciary responsibilities of plan administrators, 130
(1998). This finding may reflect the fact that a firm with an underfunded pension plan places its
secured creditors at greater risk should the PBGC terminate the plan outside of bankruptcy.
119 See 11 U.S.C. § 1112 (2000).
120 Under this model the shareholders are indifferent toward the outcome of the
bankruptcy case because they have no equity left in the firm. Under the rule of absolute priority,
shareholders in this hypothetical firm receive nothing, regardless of whether the firm
reorganizes or liquidates. Cf 11 U.S.C. §§ 726(a), 1 129(bX2) (2000) (establishing order of
priority for distribution of assets in liquidation and for treatment of creditors and equity holders
in a reorganization plan, respectively).
121 See IpPoLrro, supra note 36, at 120. Of course, firms are also likely increasing their
actuarial assumptions to preserve cash to keep the firm afloat. Either way cash is being
allocated away from the pension plan and toward shareholders.
122 See 26 U.S.C. §§ 401,404,410-417 (2000).
123 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1147, 1201-1371 (2000).
124 See 26 U.S.C. §§ 401,404 (2000).
125 See id §§ 410-412.
126 See id. § 415.
127 See generally id § 414 (definitions and special rules); id. § 416 (special rules regarding
benefits provided executives); id § 417 (rules regarding survivorship rights).
128 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031 (2000).
129 See id §§ 1051-1086.
130 See id. §§ 1101-1114.
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and the system of pension insurance administered by the PBGC. 131 Because the
Tax Code and ERISA have different goals, their interaction can lead to situations
that undermine both statutory schemes, such as IRS contribution waivers that
relieve financially burdened firms from making minimum funding contributions
and suspend penalties for not making such contributions, while imperiling the
PBGC, which must continue to insure the unfunded pension obligations. 132 When
a pension plan is terminated after the employer has filed bankruptcy, certain
portions of the Bankruptcy Code strip employees and the PBGC of the
protections granted under ERISA. 133
A. How the IRS Increases the PBGC's Exposure to Unfunded Pension
Liabilities
Both the Tax Code 134 and ERISA 135 contain provisions setting forth
minimum funding standards that operate in similar fashion.136 These minimum
funding standards are established for the dual purposes of ensuring that firms
receiving tax benefits from plan contributions are taking advantage of these tax
benefits in good faith, and establishing criteria that allow the PBGC to monitor its
exposure to plan liabilities. 137 The plan administrator is left the task of choosing
an actuarial method for valuing plan assets and making assumptions regarding
employees (turnover, disability, mortality, age differences in mortality between
employee and spouse, the probability that an employee will retire early, and
131 See id §§ 1301-1453.
132 See infra Part V.A.
133 See infra Part IV.B.
134 26 U.S.C. § 412(a) (2000).
135 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081-1086 (2000).
136 See CANAN, supra note 34, § 12.2(A).
There is considerable overlap in coverage for minimum funding standards purposes
between the Internal Revenue Code and [ERISA]--virtually all qualified plans covered by
IRC § 412 will also be covered by... ERISA..., 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1081 through 1086,
except to the extent the qualified plans do not have sufficient connection with interstate
commerce or are excluded from the coverage of... ERISA.
Id.
137 See CANAN, supra note 34, § 12.1 ("[Ilf the government is effectively to exercise
control over the level of contributions the employer makes to such plans, there must be a
standard or standards such that both the employer and the government know when the plan is
properly funded, and when it is not."). Congress intended to ensure that there was sufficient
oversight to prevent abuse of the insurance system. See H.R. REP. No. 93-533, at 14, reprinted
in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4652 ("To create a plan termination insurance program without
appropriate funding standards would permit those who present the greatest risk in terms of
exposure to benefit at the expense of employers who have developed conscientious funding
programs.").
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compensation levels) and the return on plan assets.138 All actuarial assumptions
must be "reasonable,"' 139 and the rate of return on plan assets is limited to a
"permissible range" of not more than ten percent above or below the interest rate
on 30-year Treasuries. 140 Each plan administrator is required to establish a
"minimum funding account," against which the administrator makes charges and
to which the administrator applies credits.'14 At the end of the plan year, if
138 See 26 U.S.C. § 412(c)(2)(A) (2000); CANAN, supra note 34, § 12.3(A)(2).
139 See 26 U.S.C. § 412(c)(3) (2000).
140 1d. § 412(b)(5)(B)(ii)(I). The Pension Funding Equity Act of 2004 temporarily
amended this language to give relief to employers providing pensions for plan years beginning
after December 31, 2003 and before January 1, 2006. See Pension Funding Equity Act of 2004
§ 101(b), Pub. L. No. 108-218, 118 Stat. 596. Under this Act, the 30-year Treasury would be
replaced by "a rate of interest which is not above, and not more than 10 percent below, the
weighted average of the rates of interest on amounts invested conservatively in long-term
investment grade corporate bonds during the 4-year period ending on the last day before the
beginning of the plan year."Id. § 101(b)(l)(A)(II), 118 Stat. at 597. This change will allow plan
administrators to use higher estimates of the return on plan assets in making actuarial
assumptions than are currently permitted because the rate of return on corporate debt is higher
than that on outstanding 30-year Treasuries. See Kathy Kristof, Panel to Debate Pension
Measure, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 2, 2004, at Cl ("Interest rates remain at historically low levels, but
pension experts maintain that the big problem is that the interest rate federal law dictates for
pension calculations-the 30-year Treasury bond-is artificially low. The reason: The 30-year
Treasury bond hasn't been issued in more than two years."). While this change will help
employers facing large pension liabilities, it further endangers the solvency of the PBGC and
the retirement security of employees. See Nanette Byrnes, supra note 6, at 66 ("While these
moves lighten the corporate burden, they increase the chances taxpayers will have to step in.").
This change in the interest-rate index will save plan sponsors an estimated $80 billion by
reducing plan contributions. See Carl Hulse & Micheline Maynard, $80 Billion Pension Bill Is
Approvedby the Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9,2004, at C5.
The Act also contains a provision that allows plan sponsors in the airline and steel
industries to contribute just twenty percent of the minimum funding standard for the plan for
plan years 2004 and 2005. See § 102, 118 Stat. at 599-602 (2004). It is estimated that this
provision will save airlines and steel producers $1.6 billion over this two year period. See Hulse
& Maynard, supra.
141 See 26 U.S.C. § 412(b) (2000); 29 U.S.C. § 1082(b) (2000). The charges against this
account include: (1) the normal cost for the plan year, which is the amount that must be
contributed per plan participant and is based upon the actuarial assumptions made; (2)
payments necessary to amortize any unfunded past service liability, or payments necessary to
account for employees who will receive benefits but who were employed before the plan was
created and, therefore, before any contributions were being made on their behalf; (3) net
experience loss, or the difference between the expected return on plan assets and actual return;
(4) losses resulting from changes in actuarial assumptions; (5) the amount necessary to amortize
waived funding deficiencies; and (6) certain other liabilities arising under § 412(l). See id.
§ 412(b)(2); CANAN, supra note 34, § 12.4(B). The credits to this account include: (1)
contributions during the plan year; (2) the amount necessary to amortize a decrease in the
unfunded past service liability; (3) the amount necessary to amortize any net experience gain;
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charges to the account exceed credits there is an accumulated funding
deficiency. 142 If an accumulated funding deficiency exists at the end of the year,
the Tax Code imposes an excise tax equal to ten percent of the deficiency upon
the employer, which is not tax deductible.' 43 If the accumulated funding
deficiency is not cured within the taxable period, an excise tax of one hundred
percent of the accumulated funding deficiency is imposed upon the employer.' 44
The employer or the employer's control group 145 is liable for this tax. 146
Theoretically, providing the carrot of tax deductibility for contributions and
the stick of excise taxes upon failure to meet minimum funding standards should
encourage consistent plan funding. But this scheme is undermined by the ability
of employers to receive waivers from the IRS that relieve them from making
minimum funding contributions.' 47 If an employer cannot meet the minimum
funding requirement for a plan year because of "temporary business hardship"
and application of the funding standard would be "adverse to the interests of plan
participants in the aggregate," the IRS may grant a waiver of all or a portion of the
minimum funding requirement for that year.' 48 Such waivers may only be
granted in three of any fifteen consecutive plan years. 149 The criteria for
establishing business hardship include whether or not (1) the employer is
operating at a loss; (2) there is substantial unemployment or underemployment in
(4) the amount necessary to amortize any net gain from changes in actuarial assumptions; and
(5) the amount waived under § 412(d). See id § 412(b)(3); CANAN, supra note 34, § 12.4(C).
142 See 26 U.S.C. § 412(a) (2000) (defining "accumulated funding deficiency").
143 See id § 4971(a). There is, however, an exception to this penalty. If the employer
contributes an amount equal to the "full funding limitation," which is essentially a limit on the
amount of tax-deductible contributions an employer can make to the plan in any given year, the
excise tax is not imposed, even if the funding account is left with a deficit for the year. See 26
U.S.C. § 412(c)(6)-(7) (2000); CANAN, supra note 34, § 12.5. And there is an exception to this
exception. The maximum amount deductible shall not be less than the "unfunded current
liability" of the plan. See 26 U.S.C. § 404(a)(l)(D)(i) (2000). The "unfunded current liability"
equals the liabilities to all employees and their beneficiaries under the plan. Id. § 412()(7). In
effect this means that, as a general rule, the full funding limitation cannot be less than what is
necessary to cover the plan's normal cost. See supra, note 141. The problem is that the full
funding limitation may be less than what is necessary to meet contributions to cover past
service liability, net experience loss, or other losses, leaving the plan underfunded.
144 26 U.S.C. § 497 1(b) (2000).
145 Defined by ERISA, "'controlled group' means, in connection with any person, a group
consisting of such person and all other persons under common control with such person." 29
U.S.C. § 1301(a)(14)(A) (2000). A "person" is defined as "an individual, partnership, joint
venture, corporation, mutual company, joint-stock company, trust, estate, unincorporated
organization, association, or employee organization." Id §§ 130 1(a)(20), 1002(9).
146 See 26 U.S.C. § 497 1(c)(1) (2000).
147 See id. § 412(d).
149 Id. § 412(d)(1).
149/Id.
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the employer's industry; (3) the sales and profits of the industry are depressed or
declining; and (4) it is reasonable to assume the plan will be terminated if the
waiver is not granted.150 Conspicuously absent from this list is any consideration
of the amount by which the plan is underfunded on a termination basis, or any
other consideration of the PBGC's interests in the minimum funding contribution
to be waived.' 51 No liability to the IRS, the PBGC, or the employees 52 arises
when a minimum funding waiver is granted. 153 These waivers can significantly
increase the PBGC's exposure upon termination 154 and the only relief the PBGC
realizes comes in the form of a nominal increase in premiums.' 55
B. How the Bankruptcy Code Leaves the PBGC Holding the Bag
Under ERISA, when an underfunded plan is terminated, either under distress
termination or by the PBGC, 156 the employer or the employer's control group is
subject to two forms of liability: liability to the PBGC for unfunded benefit
liabilities 157 and liability to the trustee appointed to administer the plan 158 for the
outstanding balance of accumulated funding deficiencies, waived funding
deficiencies, and any decreases in the minimum funding standard allowed before
termination. 159 Liability to the PBGC for unfunded benefit liabilities accrues
150 Id. § 412(d)(2).
151 Canan indicates that the waiver is to be granted only if it appears as though there is
some hope for the employer's recovery, though this consideration is not listed in the statute
among the factors to be considered. See CANAN, supra note 34, § 12.7(C).
152 Under a narrow set of circumstances a lien may arise in favor of the plan itself if
minimum funding contributions are not made at all. See 26 U.S.C. § 412(n) (2000). However,
this lien will not arise where a waiver is granted because the waiver becomes a credit to the
funding account. See supra note 141.
153 Liability in favor of the trustee appointed upon termination arises for the amount of
waived funding deficiencies. See 29 U.S.C. § 1362(c)(2) (2000). However, this liability proves
to be a paper dragon in the bankruptcy context, as discussed infra Part IV.B.
154 See Keating, supra note 22, at 810-11.
The use of waivers has on occasion significantly increased the liability of the PBGC. For
example, when Rath Packing terminated its pension plans in 1982, accumulated unpaid
waivers totalled [sic] $29.5 million, about half of the plans' total unfunded liability at
termination. Rath had received waivers for the then-maximum five consecutive years.
Id.
155 See supra note 92, discussing adjustments to PBGC premiums based on the amount by
which a plan is underfunded on a termination basis.
156 See supra notes 59-75 and accompanying text.
157 See 29 U.S.C. § 1362(b) (2000).
158 See id. § 1342(b)-(c); see also supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
159 See 29 U.S.C. § 1362(c) (2000).
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interest "at a reasonable rate" from the termination date, 160 is due and payable to
the PBGC as of the termination date in cash or securities acceptable to the PBGC,
161 and is limited to thirty percent of the collective net worth 162 of the employer
or the employer's control group. 163 Similarly, liability to the trustee accrues
interest from the date of termination and is due and payable to the trustee as of the
termination date. 164
There are certain provisions within the statute that attempt to prevent the use
of asset transfers, non-bankruptcy reorganizations, and mergers to avoid liability
for pension termination. Under ERISA, the transfer of assets of the employer for
the purpose of evading termination liability within five years before termination
will result in the transferee being treated as if it was a contributing sponsor of the
plan. 165 Reorganizations that are nothing more than name changes, the
consolidation of a subsidiary into a parent corporation, or mergers result in
successor liability under ERISA.166
Failure or refusal to pay the liability created upon termination after demand
gives rise to a lien in favor of the PBGC in the amount of that liability, covering
"all property and rights to property, whether real or personal" belonging to the
employer or its control group.167 This lien, like the liability arising upon
termination, is limited to thirty percent of the net worth of the employer or control
group. 168 The lien is treated as a tax lien for purposes of priority and
perfection.' 69 The lien is to be treated as a "tax due and owing to the United
1601d § 1362(b)(1)(A).
161 Id. § 1362(b)(2)(A).
162 The employer's net worth is not simply the amount by which the assets of the
employer or its control group exceed its liabilities, but is the fair market value of the firm,
determined in light of (1) any sale, agreement to sell, or offer to purchase the business of the
employer; (2) the sale or agreement to purchase the stock of the business; (3) the price of
publicly traded stock; (4) the price/earnings ratios and prices of stocks of similar companies; (5)
the economic outlook for the firm, based on projections of earnings and dividends; (6) the
economic outlook for the industry; (7) the appraised value of all assets, tangible and intangible;
(8) the value of equity assumed in a plan of reorganization under title II or similar state law;
and (9) any other factor relevant to determining net worth. See 29 C.F.R. § 4062.4(c) (2003);
CANAN, supra note 34, § 19.12(A)(1).
163 29 U.S.C. § 1362(b)(2)(B) (2000).
164 Id. § 1362(c).
165 See id § 1369(a).
166 See id § 1369(b)(1)-(3). For a case exploring the application of this section see In re
Doskocil Cos., 130 B.R. 858 (D. Kan. 1991).
167 See 29 U.S.C. § 1368(a) (2000).
168 Id.
169 See id. § 1368(c)(1). Under the Tax Code such a lien must be perfected either where
the state in which the property is located requires such filings or with the United States district
court for the district in which the property is located. See 26 U.S.C. § 6323 (b), (f) (2000).
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States" in proceedings under the Bankruptcy Code or state insolvency
proceedings. 170
Despite the appearance of protection for the PBGC's interest in the event of
termination, the Bankruptcy Code frequently strips the PBGC of the protection
provided under ERISA. Under ERISA, termination liability may arise on the date
of termination, but the lien that protects the PBGC's interest in that liability must
be perfected.' 7 1 When an employer or the PBGC terminates an employer's plan
after the employer has filed a petition in bankruptcy, the Bankruptcy Code
prevents perfection of the PBGC's lien arising out of the employer's liability in
two ways. First, the automatic stay prevents the PBGC from taking any "act to
create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate." 172 Second,
§ 545 of the Code prevents "the fixing of a statutory lien on property of the
debtor" where that lien is not perfected or enforceable against a bona fide
purchaser before the commencement of the bankruptcy proceeding. 173 Thus the
PBGC faces a termination/liability paradox-its lien cannot arise until after
termination, but termination in bankruptcy prevents perfection of the PBGC's
lien. The PBGC has attempted to use language in ERISA suggesting that the lien
it holds is a tax 174 to achieve tax priority status under the Bankruptcy Code.
175
170 See 29 U.S.C. § 1368(c)(2) (2000).
171 See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
172 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4) (2000); cf Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Belfance (In re CSC
Indus., Inc. & Copperweld Steel Co.) 232 F.3d 505, 510 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that tax lien
arising under 26 U.S.C. § 412(n)(4) for unpaid contributions could not be perfected after filing
of the petition because of the automatic stay). This provision applies to security interests, as
well as judicial and statutory liens. See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 362.03[6] (Lawrence P.
King ed., 15th ed. rev. 2004).
173 11 U.S.C. § 545(2) (2000). Collier explains the implications of § 545(2) within the
context of a federal tax lien:
The tax lien arises at the time of the assessment. The lien, however, is not valid against
"any purchaser, holder of a security interest, mechanic's lienor, or judgment lien creditor
until notice thereof... has been filed." If, therefore, notice of the tax lien has not been filed
before bankruptcy, or has been imperfectly filed, it would not be valid as against a
hypothetical bona fide purchaser as required by section 545(2), and thus would be subject
to avoidance by the trustee.
5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 545.03[4] (Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. rev. 2004) (footnotes
omitted).
174 See 29 U.S.C. § 1368(c)(2) (2000) ("In a case under title 1 1 [of the United States
Code] ... ,the lien imposed [for failure to pay liability arising upon termination] shall be
treated in the same manner as a tax due and owing to the United States for purposes of title 11
[of the United States Code] .... ).
175 There are two potential tax priorities available. The first is a tax priority treated as an
administrative expense under §§ 503(b)(1)(B) and 507(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code. See I I
U.S.C. §§ 503(b)(l)(B), 507(a)(1) (2000). This priority arises where the tax is "incurred by the
[bankruptcy] estate." Id. (legislative statements). The second is simply an excise tax priority
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Notwithstanding dicta suggesting that the Supreme Court recognizes the PBGC's
liens as tax liens, 176 two cases fiom the Tenth Circuit illustrate the difficulty that
the PBGC has had convincing lower courts to grant its liens administrative
expense or tax lien priority.' 77
In Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. Reorganized CF&I Fabricators, Inc.
(In re CF&I Fabricators, Inc.),' 78 the PBGC attempted to use priority arguments
to recover the unpaid minimum contributions 179 and unfunded benefit
liabilities 80 of a firm seeking to reorganize under Chapter 11.181 CF&I
Fabricators had unpaid minimum funding contributions of approximately $71
million and unfunded benefit liabilities of $200 million when its plan was
under § 507(a)(8)(E)(ii) of the Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(E)(ii) (2000). The
nature of these two priorities is explored further infra Part V.A. 1.
176See United States v. Reorganized CF&I Fabricators, Inc., 518 U.S. 213, 224-25
(1996) (distinguishing the excise tax imposed on employers who fail to meet the minimum
funding requirement under 26 U.S.C. § 4971(a) from the PBGC's claim for unfunded benefit
liabilities under 29 U.S.C. § 362(b)(l)(A) in a decision holding that the excise tax could not be
given tax priority status). However, the Tenth Circuit later held that the PBGC's claim is not a
tax because it is not used to defray governmental expenses. See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v.
Reorganized CF&I Fabricators, Inc. (In re CF&I Fabricators, Inc.), 150 F.3d 1293, 1298 (10th
Cir. 1998).
177 Other cases have lead to similar results. See generally Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v.
Sunarhauserman, Inc. (In re Sunarhauserman, Inc.), 126 F.3d 811 (6th Cir. 1997)
(distinguishing portion of PBGC claim that arose pre-petition from portion that arose post-
petition and granting administrative expense priority to only the post-petition portion); LTV
Corp. v. Dole (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 130 B.R. 690, 696-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), opinion
withdrawn, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21409 (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 16, 1993) (holding in original opinion
that PBGC's claims are pre-petition claims not entitled to administrative priority status or tax
priority status); In re Kent Plastics Corp., 183 BR. 841, 845-49 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1995)
(holding that ERISA claim is not the equivalent of a federal tax claim and that failure to perfect
lien before filing strips the ERISA claim of priority provided under 29 U.S.C. § 1368(c)
(2000)); In re Divco Philadelphia Sales Corp., 64 B.R. 232, 235 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986).
While it is clear that an ERISA lien for employer liability is to be treated as a tax lien for
purposes of priority, § 1368 does not state that the underlying ERISA liability is a tax
liability. Section 1368(c) merely provides that an ERISA claim and a tax claim share one
feature in common-liens of both share on a par. It is certainly a leap of faith then to say
that because one shares a single trait in common with the other, the two are identical.
Applying this logic, one could say that a donkey is the same as an elephant simply because
they both have four legs. We accordingly conclude that 29 U.S.C. § 1368 does not render
an ERISA claim a tax claim [under the Bankruptcy Code].
Id.
178 Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Reorganized CF&I Fabricators, Inc. (In re CF&I
Fabricators, Inc.) 179 B.R. 704 (D. Utah 1994), affd, 150 F.3d 1293 (10th Cir. 1998).
179 See 29 U.S.C. § 1362(c) (2000).
180 See id § 1362(b).
181 See CF&I Fabricators, 179 B.R. at 706.
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terminated by the PBGC.' 82 PBGC first argued that the claims for unpaid
minimum funding contributions should be entitled to administrative expense
priority as a post-petition tax under § 503(b)(1)(B)' 83 of the Bankruptcy Code.' 84
The court held that the PBGC's lien for the unpaid contributions had to be
perfected to receive priority status, that the lien against CF&I was not perfected,
and that the automatic stay prevented the PBGC from perfecting its lien. 185 The
court also refused to grant the unpaid minimum funding contribution claim
priority status as a tax lien under § 507(a)(8) 186 of the Bankruptcy Code, holding
that the transaction giving rise to the necessity for those payments was the labor
of the employees, which occurred pre-petition, rather than the due date for the
quarterly contribution, which apparently occurred post-petition.1 87 The PBGC
next tried to assert its claim for unpaid minimum funding contributions as an
administrative expense under § 507(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code, 188 arguing that
contributions to pension plans qualify as administrative expenses as a "cost of
doing business" during reorganization, 189 and that "the costs of compliance with
regulatory schemes qualify as administrative expenses."'190 The court applied a
two-part test to determine whether a claim qualifies as an administrative expense,
requiring that: (1) the expense arise out of a transaction between the creditor and
the DIP, and (2) the consideration provided by the creditor prove beneficial to the
DIP in the operation of the business. 191 The court held that payment of the
minimum funding contribution arises out of transactions between the debtor and
employees, not between the DIP and the PBGC, and that the only benefit the
debtor would have received from the payments was goodwill with the
employees. 192 The PBGC then argued that the unfunded portion of the terminated
182 Id. at 706.
183 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(l)(B) (2000).
184 CF&I Fabricators, 179 B.R. at 707. The PBGC argued that these claims should be
treated as a tax incurred by the estate pre-petition. Id.
185 Id. at 708.
186 At the time, the priority would have been § 507(a)(7). CF&I filed its original petition
in 1990. See CF&l Fabricators, 179 B.R. at 706. The Bankruptcy Code was amended in 1994,
and the tax priority in § 507(a)(7) was moved to § 507(a)(8). See Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 304, 108 Stat. 4106, 4132-33 (1994). The change applied only to
cases filed after Oct. 22, 1994. See id. § 702, 108 Stat. at 4150-51 (1994).
187 CF&I Fabricators, 179 B.R. at 708.
188 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1) (2000) (giving first priority status to "administrative expenses
allowed under section 503(b)").
189 See CF&I Fabricators, 179 B.R. at 708. Cf 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(A) (2000)
(allowing as an administrative expense "the actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving
the estate").
190 CF&I Fabricators, 179 B.R. at 708.
191 Id at 708 (citing In re Amarex Inc., 853 F.2d 1526, 1530 (1 0th Cir. 1988)).
192 Id at 708-09.
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pension plan, up to the amount allowed by ERISA, 193 should be treated as a tax
lien and granted priority under § 507(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Code. 194 Once
again the court held that because no lien had been perfected before the filing, and
the automatic stay prevented post-petition perfection, the PBGC's claim could not
achieve priority status.195
On appeal from the district court's decision, the PBGC again argued that its
lien for unpaid mandatory contributions should be treated as a tax lien and granted
priority as an administrative expense. 196 The circuit court held that the PBGC's
claim for unpaid mandatory contributions could never qualify as a tax lien
because the payments required under ERISA are not a tax, 197 nor could this claim
be granted priority status as an administrative expense because it arose pre-
petition.198
The PBGC also failed to obtain priority as an administrative expense for its
claim arising out of unfunded benefit liabilities in In re Bayly Corp.199 In Bayly,
the PBGC relied exclusively on the argument that its claim for unfunded benefit
liabilities should be treated as a tax lien and allowed as an administrative expense
under § 503(b)(1)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code.200 That court refused to extend this
priority, explaining that:
If a debtor becomes liable to a claimant before the bankruptcy petition is filed,
but the liability is contingent on the occurrence of some future event, the claim to
recover that debt is treated as a pre-petition claim even if the condition does not
193 This lien is limited to thirty percent of the net worth of the company. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 1362(b)(2)(B) (2000). In this case, that amount was $3 million despite unfunded pension
obligations exceeding $200 million. See CF&l Fabricators, 179 B.R. at 709.
194 Then § 507(a)(7). See supra note 186.
195 See CF&I Fabricators, 179 B.R. at 709.
196 Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Reorganized CF&I Fabricators, Inc. (In re CF&I
Fabricators, Inc.), 150 F.3d 1293, 1296-99 (10th Cir. 1998).
197 Id. at 1298.
198 Id. at 1300. Interestingly, the court points out that where Congress wanted to create an
administrative priority to protect retirees' healthcare benefits, it amended the Bankruptcy Code
by adding § 1114, but "[i]n contrast, Congress has not amended the Bankruptcy Code to
provide administrative status for the PBGC's minimum funding contribution claim." Id. See the
discussion of § 1114 infra notes 235-37.
199 Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Skeen (In re Bayly Corp.), 163 F.3d 1205, 1210 (10th
Cir. 1998). Unlike CF&I Fabricators, in which the circuit court concluded that the PBGC's
claim for unfunded benefit liabilities could never be characterized as a tax, the Bayly court
assumed, arguendo, that the PBGC's claim was such a tax. See id. at 1208 n.4. ("[W]e find it
expeditious simply to assume without deciding that PBGC's claim for unfunded benefit
liabilities can properly be characterized as a tax claim . .
200 Id. at 1207.
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occur and the right to payment does not arise until after the bankruptcy petition is
filed.20 1
... The consideration supporting PBGC's claim is the same as that supporting
the right to pension benefits itself, the past labor of Debtor's employees. Plan
termination simply matured Debtor's pre-petition contingent liability to fund the
Plan adequately. Thus, PBGC's claim is not entitled to administrative expense
priority as a post-petition tax.202
While this view seems to misunderstand the consideration given to the
employer as the employee's labor, rather than the insurance provided by the
PBGC, the result is that where the PBGC fails to perfect its lien against the
employer before the employer seeks bankruptcy protection, unpaid minimum
funding contributions are treated as pre-petition debts arising out of the
employer's relationship to its employees. 203 Thus, unable to achieve priority
status, the PBGC becomes an unsecured creditor of the bankrupt plan provider,2° 4
receiving whatever dividend the plan provides for such creditors. 20 5
201 Id. at 1208-9.
202 Id. at 1210.
203 The PBGC seems to have initially accepted this fate. In the case of U.S. Airways'
pilots' pension, the PBGC argued over the size of its allowed claim, rather than attempting to
recover the whole of that claim through tax and administrative expense priorities. See In re U.S.
Airways Group, Inc., 303 B.R. 784, 786 (E.D. Va. 2003). However, with United and U.S.
Airways threatening termination of their plans, the PBGC has once again taken up this issue.
The agency is now arguing that the PBGC should be able to perfect its lien post-petition and
that plan sponsors should be required to give notification to employees within 30 days of the
plan sponsor's filing regarding the amount by which the plan is underfunded and limits on
PBGC benefits. See Albert B. Crenshaw, Pension Agency Seeks More Power, WASH. POST,
Sept. 15, 2004, at E3; News Release, PBGC, PBGC Calls for Pension Protections: Actions of
US Airways and UAL Underscore Need for Fix (Sept. 14, 2004),
http://www.pbgc.gov/news/press-releases/2004/prO4_65.htm.
204 See 11 U.S.C. § 546(a) (2000) (distinguishing between secured and unsecured allowed
claims); Keating, supra note 77, at 91 (noting that the PBGC is "treated like just another
unsecured creditor").
205 In the case of U.S. Airways, this amounts to two cents on the dollar, paid in stock of
the reorganized company. See In re U.S. Airways Group, Inc., 303 B.R. at 786. The amount of
PBGC's allowed claim for unfunded benefit liabilities exceeds $2 billion in that case, meaning
the PBGC will receive $40 million in stock. Id. at 787 (tabulated from source). The PBGC has
historically recovered "about eight cents on the dollar." See Keating, supra note 77, at 66.
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V. PREVENTING THE ABUSE OF CHAPTER 11 REORGANIZATION
The inability of the PBGC to recover against employers that terminate their
plans in Chapter 11 threatens the stability of the PBGC itself.20 6 Depriving the
PBGC of the opportunity to recover unfunded benefit liabilities gives employers
incentive to reallocate resources away from their pension plans 20 7 and to file
bankruptcy even when the firm is otherwise solvent,208 and leads to abuse of both
the insurance scheme created under ERISA209 and the Bankruptcy Code.210
Similar abuse of the Bankruptcy Code arose after the Bildisco decision,
leading to changes in the Bankruptcy Code to limit the ability of employers to
unilaterally reject labor agreements in bankruptcy. 211 If employers' use of the
bankruptcy code to surreptitiously avoid labor agreements warranted statutory
change, use of ERISA, the Tax Code, and the Bankruptcy Code to evade pension
obligations certainly merits consideration for similar change.
206 See supra notes 11, 16 (discussing the financial position of the PBGC) and Part IV.B
(discussing the inability of the PBGC to perfect its lien).
207 See supra Part I.A.
208 See supra Part III.C.
209 At least one court recognized that "[i]f ERISA goals are to be met, the [PBGC] claim
must have priority," but this decision appears to have had no influence on other federal courts.
See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. The Washington Group, Inc. (In re The Washington Group,
Inc.), No. C-86-665-G, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5686, at *20 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 9, 1987).
The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation has priority for its termination liability
claim. Title 29, [U.S.C.], Section 1368(c)(1-4) grants priority to perfected and unperfected
Agency liens. This statute gives priority to the claim because it directs courts to treat the
Agency lien as a tax lien. Furthermore, policy considerations support the Agency's
contention that its claim has priority. The Agency had no opportunity to perfect its claim
because the parties terminated the Plan six months after Washington Group filed its
bankruptcy petition.... Seldom, if at any time, will the Agency have the opportunity to
file its claim before the bankrupt files the bankruptcy petition.... If the Agency's claim
lacks priority, then it would defeat the purpose for which Congress created [the
PBGC] ....
id. at *19-20.
2 10 See MCGLL, supra note 78, at 50. "There is serious doubt concerning the propriety-
and feasibility-of invoking a pension guaranty when the firm that created the pension
obligations continues to operate in one form or the other." McGill further notes:
Not only should the [pension] guaranty be limited to complete plan terminations, it
should be invoked only when the firm goes out of business. It would be grossly unfair to
other employers, some of them competitors, if a firm could terminate its pension plan,
transfer to the guaranty fund the responsibility for making good on the unfunded
guaranteed benefits, and then continue in business, its competitive position improved by
reduction in its labor costs.
Id. at 79.
211 See supra notes 18-26 and accompanying text.
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A. Previous Recommendations for Change
Those who have addressed the issue of pension plan termination in the
Chapter 11 context have recommended statutory change, either by granting the
PBGC administrative expense or tax priority under the Bankruptcy Code212 or a
non-lien super-priority that must be satisfied before the assets of an employer with
unfunded benefit liabilities can be sold.213 Each of these proposals proves
untenable after further scrutiny.214 However, statutory change giving rise to a pre-
petition floating lien for unfunded benefit liabilities may prove an effective means
for removing some of the moral hazard created by public insurance of pension
plans and providing the PBGC with protection when an employer files
bankruptcy.215 At the very least, the PBGC should be given the authority to grant
the minimum funding waivers now granted by the IRS,216 since it is the PBGC-
not the IRS-that insures against the risk of a plan being terminated without
waived contributions having been made.
1. Priority Status for PBGC Claims
Granting heightened priority in bankruptcy to the PBGC's claim for unpaid
benefit liabilities and minimum funding contributions has been advanced by
some2 17 and criticized by others.218 In her student note, Jill L. Uylaki219 argues
212 See Uylaki, supra note 34, at 110-11.
213 See Keating, supra note 77, at 100-07.
214 Priority status under the Bankruptcy Code has been rejected by federal courts and, in
any event, would most likely prevent the confirmation of any plan under Chapter 11 where the
employer has significant unfunded benefit liabilities. See infra notes 217-19 and accompanying
text. Keating's super-priority would prevent a firm from selling assets or obtaining secured
credit in bankruptcy, thus limiting the employer's ability to reorganize. See infra notes 228-41
and accompanying text.
215 See infra Part V.B.1.
216 See infra Part V.B.2.
217 See Uylaki, supra note 34, at 110-11 (recommending that the PBGC's lien against
employers with unfunded or underfunded obligations receive priority status similar to tax liens
under 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)).
218 See Keating, supra note 77, at 92-96. Keating points out that this solution is not
complete because many firms terminating their plans do not enter into bankruptcy. A
heightened priority would create perverse incentives on the part of the PBGC, which would
have an incentive to terminate a plan even where doing so forces an otherwise solvent firm into
bankruptcy, and on the part of other creditors, who would have an incentive to avoid
bankruptcy even if doing so would be best for the corporation. The National Bankruptcy
Conference concurs, stating that ERISA problems should not be resolved by modifying the
Bankruptcy Code. See THE NATIONAL BANKRUTCY CONFERENCE, RER)RMING THE
BANKRUPrCY CODE 270-71 (Final Report, May 1, 1997) ("Mhere is no justification for special
provisions in the Bankruptcy Code to deal with [the PBGC's claims]. It would be inappropriate
to resolve Bankruptcy Code priority issues through language in ERISA. In the absence of any
compelling reason to change the statutes, it would be preferable to leave these issues to case law
development.").
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that the PBGC's claims should be granted tax-lien priority-an eighth priority
under the Bankruptcy Code. 220 Such a priority would place the PBGC behind
administrative expenses, DIP-financing provided in involuntary cases, employee
claims for wages and pension payments, and customers who have paid for
consumer goods or services.221 Alternatively, the PBGC's claims could be
granted priority status as an administrative expense, placing the PBGC ahead of
all other priority creditors.222
As the cases of In re CF&I Fabricators and In re Bayly Corp. illustrate,
federal courts have been unwilling to recognize any sound basis for granting
either form of priority.223 The principle stumbling block before priority status for
the PBGC's claims is that these claims arise pre-petition out of transactions with
the debtor, not the debtor-in-possession, and that these transactions provide no
benefit to the bankruptcy estate.224
There is also a practical reason for not granting the PBGC's claim tax-priority
status: doing so could prevent the confirmation of most Chapter 11 reorganization
plans filed in cases where the employer terminates its pension plan. Under § 1129
of the Bankruptcy Code, the reorganization plan must provide for the payment of
administrative expenses in full upon confirmation,225 and the payment of tax
priorities in full over six years.226 For some firms in Chapter 11, unpaid benefit
liabilities may be the largest single liability.227 Forcing those firms to pay that
219 Uylaki, supra note 34, at 110-11 ('The present proposal recommends that the PBGC's
lien against employers with unfunded or underfunded... pension plans should receive an
eighth priority status .... ).
220 See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8).
221 See id. § 507(a)()-(8). Technically the PBGC would be behind certain agricultural
and fishing creditors, alimony, and support payments, but it is assumed that these types of
priorities will not arise in the usual case under examination here. The priority for pension
contributions under this section is limited to a fixed amount under the Code-net of unpaid
wages granted priority. See id. § 507(a)(4).
222 Administrative expenses are defined by the code to include "any tax ... incurred by
the estate, except a tax of a kind specified in section 507(a)(8)." 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(l)(B)
(2000).
223 See supra notes 178-205 and accompanying text, discussing the treatment of priority
arguments advanced by the PBGC in these two cases. An argument could be made, but
apparently was not advanced by the PBGC in either case, that the estate does, in fact, benefit
from the insurance provided by the PBGC where the promise of such insurance lured
employees into accepting less in current wages under labor contracts and those contracts are not
rejected by the DIP. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
224 See supra notes 187, 202 and accompanying text (describing the application of this
argument in CF&I Fabricators and Bayly).
225 See 11 U.S.C. § 1 129(a)(9)(A) (2000).
226 See id § 11 29(a)(9)(C).
227 Anecdotally, in May of 2003 Business Week Online reported that General Motors had
plan obligations of $92.2 billion, plan assets of $66.8 billion, and a market value of only $20.5
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liability up front before confirmation, or even over a period of six years, may
eliminate the benefit of reorganization, pushing the firm into liquidation.
2. Super-Priority Status
Professor Keating suggests granting the PBGC a so-called "super-
priority," 228 similar to the priority granted to workers for the amount of unpaid
minimum wages under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).229 "Under this
statute, the PBGC would be given the power to have a court enjoin the transfer of
a company's assets until the agency's reimbursement claim was satisfied in
full."'230 This priority would block other creditors, including those with perfected
security interests, from levying against assets of the employer.23 1 This lien would
apply prospectively and be subordinate to purchase-money security interests. 232
In addition, under Keating's super-priority mechanism, "the PBGC's
reimbursement claim trumps even secured creditors and... retains its
effectiveness in a company's bankruptcy proceeding. '233 According to Keating,
one of the principle advantages to this super-priority is that it shifts the cost of
monitoring employers' contributions to pension plans from the PBGC to
creditors, who bear the risk of their collateral becoming unalienable. 234
It is ironic that Professor Keating would endorse such a priority, given his
criticism of Congress' attempt to grant retiree claims for unfunded health benefits
an administrative expense priority under the Bankruptcy Code. 23 5 Professor
billion. In other words, GM's unfunded benefit liabilities were over three times its market value.
See David Henry, Tripping Over Pension Shortfalls, Bus. WK. ONLINE, May 14, 2003, at
http://www. businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/may2003/nf20030514_6402_db014.htm.
228 See Keating, supra note 77, at 100-107.
229 Under the FLSA, employers in the United States are required to pay a minimum wage.
See 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1) (2000). When this wage is not paid, the Secretary of Labor may
enjoin the introduction of the product of that labor into interstate commerce. See 29 U.S.C.
§ 215(a)(1) (2000); Citicorp Indus. Credit, Inc. v. Brock, 483 U.S. 27, 39 (1987).
230 Keating, supra note 77, at 100.
231 Id.
232 Id. See UCC § 9-103 (2000) for a definition of purchase-money security interest.
233 Keating, supra note 77, at 100.
2 34 See id. at 102 ("[C]reditors of the firn would have a more powerful incentive to
investigate the funding status of the company's pension plans and would set their credit prices
accordingly. In effect, the super[-]priority given to the PBGC would transfer most of the
monitoring function from the PBGC to an employer's various creditors.").
235 In response to LTV's first bankruptcy, during which it sought to terminate both the
pension plans and the health insurance benefits of its retirees, Congress added § 1114 to the
Bankruptcy Code. This new section grants the retirees' claims for promised health benefits an
administrative expense priority. See 11 U.S.C. § 11 14(e)(2) (2000). Professor Keating has
criticized Congress' attempt to deal with this problem. See generally, Daniel Keating,
Bankruptcy Code § 1114: Congress' Empty Response to the Retiree Plight, 67 AM. BANKR.
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Keating's super-priority is broader than the priority granted to retiree health
benefits in § 1114 of the Bankruptcy Code, applying even to solvent firms selling
assets outside of bankruptcy. Thus, Keating's super-priority avoids his primary
criticism of § 1114, which is a post hoc solution to a problem that is created
outside of bankruptcy. 236 However, granting the PBGC this super-priority status
could prevent the successful reorganization of potentially-viable firms by
encumbering assets that otherwise might be used as collateral to secure
financing.237 Under § 364238 of the Code, the DIP may use a number of
incentives to procure financing. The DIP may first attempt to obtain unsecured
credit by offering the creditor administrative expense priority in retun. 239 If the
DIP is unable to obtain unsecured credit in this fashion, the court may authorize
the DIP to either (1) extend so-called super super-priority, which gives an
unsecured lender priority over all other priority creditors,240 (2) use
L.J. 17 (1993) [hereinafter Keating, Bankruptcy Code § 1114]; Dan Keating, Good Intentions,
Bad Economics: Retiree Insurance Benefits in Bankruptcy, 43 VAND. L. REv. 161 (1990)
[hereinafter Keating, GoodIntentions].
236 See Keating, Bankruptcy Code § 1114, supra note 235, at 18 ("[A]dding this new
section to the Bankruptcy Code completely ignores the fundamental underlying problem, which
is lack of mandatory prefunding for companies that promise retiree benefits."); Keating, Good
Intentions, supra note 235, at 163.
Because section 1114 applies only to Chapter 11 cases, the new legislation will affect only
a small percentage of cases in which companies become insolvent. Although retirees now
will receive a special priority for their benefits claims in Chapter 11 cases, they will have
no similar preferred position in Chapter 7 liquidation cases or in nonbankruptcy
dissolutions.
Id.
237 Keating points to this very same effect as a critical flaw with the administrative
expense priority granted retiree benefits under § 1114. Cf Keating, Good Intentions, supra note
235, at 163.
[S]ection 1114 may make it less likely that companies with significant retiree benefits
liabilities will be able to reorganize successfully. If retirees receive a greater relative
entitlement in a Chapter 11 case than in a Chapter 7 case, other unsecured creditors will
see their recovery in a Chapter 11 case reduced. Thus, these nonretiree unsecured creditors
may have an incentive to block a company's Chapter 11 reorganization plan even when
the company's going-concern value would be realized best in the Chapter 11 forum.
Id.
238 11 U.S.C. § 364 (2000).
239 See id§ 364(a), (b).
240 See id § 364(c)(1). This term of art has gained judicial recognition. See In re
Willingham Inv., Inc., 203 B.R. 75, 77 n.7 (Bankr. Tenn. 1996) ("If a debtor in possession or
trustee is unable to obtain credit by granting the lender an administrative expense claim
pursuant to § 364(b), the lender may be granted a super super[-]priority pursuant to Bankruptcy
Code § 364(c) .... ).
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unencumbered collateral to obtain secured financing, 241 or (3) grant a subordinate
security interest in already-secured property. 242 Finally, if the DIP proves
unsuccessful in obtaining credit through any other means, he may grant senior
secured status to lenders using already-secured property as collateral.243 Under
this process of obtaining DIP-financing, Keating's super-priority would increase
the DIP's cost of borrowing. Because all property of the estate would be
encumbered by Keating's super-priority,244 the pool of potential assets from
which priority creditors might collect is diminished, thereby eliminating the
possibility for unsecured lending. Super super-priority status would be of dubious
value, since even those with super-priority245 would fall in line behind the PBGC.
Because the PBGC's super-priority would serve to eliminate the alienability of
estate assets, even if unencumbered assets or partially secured assets exist, the
debtor would be hard pressed to find lenders willing to extend secured credit with
those assets as collateral. If the DIP still believes obtaining credit is worth the
cost, the question then becomes whether or not the bankruptcy court could use its
authority to grant DIP-lenders overriding security interests in already-secured
property to overcome the PBGC's super-priority. If so, the purpose of Keating's
super-priority will be defeated.
Under § 363 of the Bankruptcy Code246 the DIP can "use, sell, or lease"
property of the bankruptcy estate.247 The property can be sold "free and clear of
any interest in such property of an entity other than" the DIP only if "applicable
nonbankruptcy law permits sale of such property free and clear of such interest"
or the interested party consents.248 The very purpose of the Keating super-priority
would be to strip the DIP of the ability to sell the property and it is unlikely that
the PBGC would consent to the sale of property unless it receives the proceeds.
Thus, the bankruptcy estate would be permanently encumbered by property that
might otherwise prove profitable to sell.
241 See 11 U.S.C. § 364(c)(2) (2000).
242 See id § 364(cX3).
243 See id § 364(d)(1).
244 Technically, Keating's super-priority is not a "lien," but is instead a way of granting
the PBGC authority to enjoin the sale of assets until unfunded benefit liabilities are met. The
practical consequence is the same as that of a first-lien holder. In either case, lien or power to
enjoin, the employer cannot dispose of its assets without PBGC approval, which limits the
marketability of those assets in the same fashion as a lien on identified property.
245 Super super-priority refers to the status given creditors who are granted "adequate
protection" that fails. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(b) (2000). Super super-priority status places these
creditors ahead of all other priority claims. See 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 507.02 (Lawrence
P. King ed., 15th ed. rev. 2004).
246 11 U.S.C. § 363 (2000).
2 4 7 See id. § 363(bX1).
248 Id § 363(f)(1), (2).
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Finally, this super-priority would apply to executory contracts, which become
part of the bankruptcy estate.249 Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code gives the
DIP general authority to assume, reject, or assign such contracts. 250 Presumably,
the DIP would not be able to assign such contracts for value without the PBGC's
authority. Thus, while Keating's proposal does possess the benefit of imposing on
creditors the cost of policing pension plan funding outside of bankruptcy, it may
prove catastrophic inside bankruptcy, where creditors would be unwilling to lend
to the debtor and the debtor would be stuck with unprofitable assets and contracts.
3. The Market Solution-Sponsor Pooling and Risk-Based Premiums
Former PBGC chief economist Richard Ippolito has recommended that
Congress convert defined benefit pension insurance from a government
sponsored and guaranteed program to a private pooling mechanism, through
which all plan sponsors would collectively bear the risk of an individual plan
sponsor's termination and market and sponsor-specific factors would set
premiums. 251 Under Mr. Ippolito's plan, the federal government would transfer
sufficient funds to the PBGC to eliminate the current PBGC deficit with a cushion
to account for any understatement of existing PBGC obligations.25 2 After the
PBGC is terminated, plan sponsors would belong to a self-insurance pool that
would have a governing board to set premiums and policy.253 All plan sponsors
in the pool would be jointly liable for unfunded liabilities that arise in the pool
upon termination of a covered plan.254 After a given period of time, plan sponsors
would be free to seek insurance in the private sector, giving weaker sponsors
incentive to "reduc[e] their reliance on payments from well-funded plans so as to
keep them as a source of some help in solving the underfunding problem." 255
Premiums would be set for each member of the pool according to the expected
249 See id § 541(aXl).
250 Id § 365(a).
251 See Richard A. Ippolito, How to Reduce the Cost of Federal Pension Insurance, POL'Y
ANALYSiS, No. 523 (Cato Institute), Aug. 24, 2004, at 13-15, available at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa523.pdf
252 Id at 13. Mr. Ippolito suggests that Congress give the PBGC a total of $18.7 billion:
$11.2 to cover the PBGC's deficit and $7.5 billion to account for the assumption that "current
conditions are most likely consistent with claims that outstrip revenues over the next 10 years."
Id.
253 Id. Presumably, this board would determine the level of benefits guaranteed by the
pool, though Mr. Ippolito does not state whether the pool would guarantee the full amount of
benefits promised or, as the PBGC, a maximum level of promised benefits.
254 1d.255 Id. at 14.
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loss to the pool from that member.256 According to Ippolito, the virtue of this plan
is that "[t]he insureds themselves absorb market volatility instead of offloading it
to a third party (namely, the taxpayer). '257 Because premiums are set according to
the risk the individual plan sponsor poses to the entire pool, "there is no need for a
complex set of funding rules. '258
Mr. Ippolito's plan has the virtue of eliminating the moral hazard associated
with fixed premiums unrelated to risk.2 59 Premiums linked to risk would give
plan sponsors at least some incentive, as Mr. Ippolito states, "to face up to the
problems that their own underfunding creates."260 However, by allowing the
strongest plan sponsors to eventually seek insurance from the market (and
presumably get out of the pool), only the weakest swimmers are left in the pool.
In addition, Mr. Ippolito's plan calls for all members of the pool to be held jointly
liable for the deficiencies of those that drown, giving the strongest swimmers
further incentive to seek insurance in the private market and get out of the pool.261
And, of course, while creating market premiums would give all sponsors an
incentive to increase funding levels and reduce investment risk within their
individual plans, struggling plan sponsors have much greater incentive to
terminate their plans rather than continuing to make contributions and pay high
premiums. 262 While this reduces risk to the pool, it does nothing to protect the
retirement security of those entitled to benefits under terminated plans.
Mr. Ippolito may also rely too heavily on market forces (i.e., higher
premiums) as an incentive to adequately fund pension obligations and invest
pension assets in less risky, long-term debt. Even if his method is applied, highly
leveraged plan sponsors still have an incentive to roll the dice on riskier
256 Id. at 7, 14. Ippolito uses the following formula to express the expected loss from each
member of the pool: ELi p,Li,*[(1-ft) - ai, fij E= 0, where ELi, = expected loss from insuring
the 1h plan in time t; f, the market probability of bankruptcy within the entire pool; f, =
funding value for the I plan sponsor in time t; a, = share of equities in the Ih plan at time t; ri, =
equity return on the Ih plan at time t. This formula takes into consideration both the firm's
exposure to unfunded liabilities as well as the plan sponsor's decision to invest in higher-risk
equities rather than debt. Termination risk is estimated by proxy, using the probability of
bankruptcy for the market.
257 See Ippolito, supra note 251, at 14.
2 58 Id at 15.
2 59 See supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
260 Ippolito, supra note 251, at 15.
261 Cf supra note 17, discussing the incentive given those with better-funded pensions to
withdraw from the PBGC insurance system as transfers within the system to those with poorly
funded plans increase.
262 See Keating, supra note 77, at 97 n.174 ("[T]here is a... practical problem in
instituting a strict variable-rate premium structure. The problem is that such a system might
cause high-risk sponsors to go out of business as a result of their increased premium.").
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investments of plan assets, as they do under the current system.263 The highly
leveraged plan sponsor can invest plan assets in high-risk equities in period tl,
hoping for a large return. If that sponsor wins his gamble and shifts out of equities
and into long-term debt obligations before the end of period t1, he can increase the
level of funding within the plan upon which premiums will be based in period t2
while avoiding an increase in premiums due to equity risk exposure. If that
sponsor loses his gamble, he can simply terminate the plan in period t2, throwing
the deficit into the pool and exiting the market entirely. This scenario may be
extreme, but if the gamble is large enough, the loss to the jointly liable pool could
be staggering.264
Furthermore, Mr. Ippolito's plan does not wholly resolve the issue of chronic
underfunders' use of bankruptcy to evade pension obligations. Imposing a
premium structure that accounts for both funding deficits and termination risk will
at the very least penalize such plan sponsors. However, nothing prevents those
same plan sponsors from filing Chapter 11, terminating their plans, and throwing
those plans into the pension pool while remaining in business to the benefit of
other creditors. Only a portion of the moral hazard implicit in the current system
is resolved because those unwilling to meet their pension obligations could still
use bankruptcy to evade those obligations. 265 Nevertheless, Mr. Ippolito has
clearly illustrated that pension insurance premiums can be linked to not only
funding deficits but also termination risk, and therefore termination risk must be
factored into PBGC premiums. 266
4. Piercing the Corporate Veil-Shareholder Liability
At least one author has suggested that ERISA should be amended to impose
liability on shareholders for an employer's failure to make contributions to
263 See supra note 85 and accompanying text (discussing incentives to use aggressive
estimates of the return on plan assets to reduce contributions).
264 Another criticism regarding Mr. Ippolito's method for calculating premiums includes
difficulty in predicting bankruptcies. See Vineeta Anand, Just a Suggestion: Privatize PBGC to
Protect Taxpayers, Pensioners, PENsIoNs & INvEsTMENT's, Sept. 6, 2004, at 8 (citing to
interview with Ron Gebhardtsbauer, currently a senior fellow at the American Academy of
Actuaries and former chief actuary at the PBGC). However, as Ippolito and Boyce discuss,
there are several models that can be used to predict bankruptcy. See Ippolito & Boyce, supra
note 92, at 130 n.28. The model as specified above uses the probability of bankruptcy across the
entire pool to adjust for termination risk. See supra note 256. Mr. Ippolito has elsewhere
acknowledged that this factor would be more useful if each firm's premiums were adjusted to
reflect the risk of bankruptcy across industry or firm-size. See Ippolito & Boyce supra note 92,
at 140.
265 Unless, of course, Mr. Ippolito's plan also allowed the pool to perfect a security
interest against the assets of the impecunious plan sponsor.
266 See Ippolito, supra note 251; Ippolito & Boyce, supra note 92.
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pension plans.267 To some extent such liability is unnecessary because the Tax
Code ostensibly imposes penalties on employers who fail to make mandatory
contributions. 268 But the suggestion could be extrapolated to hold shareholders
liable for unfunded benefit liabilities and unpaid minimum funding contributions,
particularly in light of the notion of bankruptcy for profit.269 According to
DiSanto, "[t]he rationale for holding a shareholder liable [for failure of the
employer to make contributions] is that the shareholder exerted tremendous
control on the corporation sufficient enough to qualify the person as an employer
under ERISA.' '270 However, when considering large firms with potentially
hundreds of thousands of shareholders,271 it seems unlikely that those
shareholders can reasonably be said to exert enough influence over the company
to qualify as employers. In addition, it would seem counterproductive to impose
liability on shareholders at a firm where the employees are the majority
shareholders, such as United Airlines.272 Finally, one is left to ask what benefit
would be left to the corporate form if such liability were imposed.
B. Toward a Workable Solution-Overcoming Incentives to Underfund
Alterations to the Bankruptcy Code may not solve the use of Chapter 11
reorganization to avoid unfunded pension obligations, as was the case twenty
years ago when employers used the Bildisco decision to unilaterally reject their
labor contracts. 273 However, the pension insurance scheme under ERISA and the
contribution mechanism under the Tax Code present several defects that
encourage employers to underfund their pension plans.274 While an optimal
solution to the pension underfunding problem would force employers to make
sufficient contributions to their pension plans, legislation to achieve such a result
267 See Nella DiSanto, Comment, Piercing the Corporate Veil to Recover Pension
Payments: It's Time to Address the Issue, 33 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 497 (2000).
268 See supra notes 143-46 and accompanying text.
269 See supra Part III.C.
270 See DiSanto, supra note 267, at 511 (footnotes omitted).
271 For instance, in its last quarterly report before filing for bankruptcy protection, U.S.
Airways reported 68,133,000 shares of common stock outstanding. See U.S. AIRWAYS GROUP,
INC., QUARTERLY REPORT, FORM 10-Q (May 10, 2002) available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/701345/000070134502000017/march02 I Oq.htm.
272 "In July 1994, the stockholders of UAL approved a plan of recapitalization that
provided an approximately 55% equity and voting interest in UAL to certain employees of
United...." UAL CORP., ANNUAL REPORT, FORM 10K (Mar. 28, 2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/100517/000010051703000007/ual.htm.
273 See THE NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY CONFERENCE, supra note 218, at 271 (stating that
ERISA problems should not be solved by altering the Bankruptcy Code).
274 See supra Part III (discussing the moral hazard created by PBGC insurance), Part IV.A
(discussing minimum funding waivers granted by the IRS).
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seems unlikely, given the sympathetic ear employers have found in Congress. 275
Yet there is a risk to Congressional inaction, namely the possibility that the PBGC
could become insolvent, forcing Congress to fund it out of the general budget.276
Perhaps a more politically palatable solution would be to allow the PBGC to
protect itself against the risk of post-petition termination of large underfunded
plans. This goal may be achieved by amending ERISA to allow the PBGC to
perfect a lien against the assets of those who fail to meet minimum funding
standards at the end of each taxable period, and by moving the power to grant
waivers for minimum funding from the IRS2 7 7 to the PBGC, which actually bears
the risk of allowing such waivers.
1. The Floating Lien Mechanism
The first problem facing the PBGC in cases such as U.S. Airways, or most of
the steel bankruptcies (National Steel a notable exception), is the
termination/liability paradox.278 The second is the incentive given to employers to
underfund their pension plans under ERISA.279 If the PBGC were able to perfect
a lien against employers in the amount by which minimum funding contributions
prove inadequate (in light of market realities) at the end of each tax year, the
PBGC would not be left with a wholly unperfected security interest when an
employer files Chapter 11 and then seeks to terminate its pension plan. The
PBGC could be given the authority to determine the amount by which the
minimum funding contributions prove inadequate at the end of each tax period,
using actuarial assumptions that account for the rate of return on plan assets
realized by similarly situated employers within that employer's industry.280 On its
275 See supra note 140. Senators Arlen Specter and Rick Santorum (R-PA) attempted to
introduce legislation in the Senate to allow U.S. Airways to amortize the underfunded portion
of its pilots' pension plan over 30 years to avoid termination. This bill was blocked by Senator
Charles Grassley (R-IA), who stated that what was needed was "a solution that would be
nation-wide, not dealing with just one company." See Specter to Hold Hearing on US Airways'
Employee Pension Plans, AVIATION DAILY, Jan. 14 2003, at 1. Representative Dave Camp (R-
MI) attempted to provide airlines with relief from their unfunded pension liabilities with the
Pension Preservation and Savings Expansion Act of 2003. Marilyn Geewax, Airlines Seek
Special Break on Pension Funding Rules, Cox News Service, July 17, 2003. While this bill
died in the House, airlines and steel producers received relief under the Pension Funding Equity
Act of 2004, discussed supra note 140.
276 See supra note 52.
277 See supra Part IV.A.
278 See supra Part IV.B.
279 See supra Part III (discussing the moral hazard created by pension insurance that leads
to underfunding).
280 Bradley D. Belt, director of the PBGC, has proposed requiring plan sponsors to mark
plan assets to market rather than using "smoothed averages" of plan assets. See Anand, supra
note 93. See also Ippolito, supra note 251, at 15 ("A large part of the problem would disappear
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face such authority might appear to be simply an attempt to supplant the authority
granted firms to set their own actuarial assumptions under ERISA. 28 1 But the
employer would be free to use "reasonable" actuarial assumptions to determine
the contributions necessary to meet the minimum funding standards set for the
Tax Code. However, the risk that those projections may prove overly optimistic is
shifted to the employer, who will be forced to make up the deficit at the end of the
year based on the actual rate of return realized by similarly situated firms in the
employer's industry. If the employer fails to do so, the PBGC will receive a lien
in the amount by which the employer's contributions prove inadequate.
This mechanism is distinguishable from the excise tax imposed on firms that
fail to meet their minimum funding standard under the Tax Code,282 which
depends on the employer meeting a funding target based on the employer's
actuarial assumptions. Instead, the firm will be penalized for using aggressive
estimates of the rate of return on plan assets, investing those assets unwisely (e.g.,
in company stock), and failing to make minimum funding contributions. 283 Such
a policy need not result in huge cash contributions to the plan at the end of the tax
period. Instead, the PBGC will calculate the amount by which the employer
underestimated the amount necessary to sufficiently fund benefit liabilities,
current portions of past service liabilities and previous waivers, and the amount
by which plan assets are diminished by negative investment returns and request
payment. If payment is not forthcoming, the PBGC will perfect a form of floating
lien against the assets of the employer. 284 The amount of the lien would not
include non-current past service liabilities, which create a large portion of pension
plan deficits but are subject to amortization over a 30-year period.285 However, all
even if the insurance were operated as it is now, with one change. Eliminate the loopholes that
permit sponsors of underfunded plans to evade the variable rate premium and require sponsors
to calculate market value underfunding.") (emphasis added).
281 See 26 U.S.C. § 412(c)(3) (2000).
282 See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
283 In effect, this system compensates the plan for mistaken estimates of the normal cost
and the actual experience loss. See supra note 141.
284See U.C.C. §9-204(a) (2001) (allowing for security interest in after-acquired
collateral).
This section adopts the principle of a "continuing general lien" or "floating lien." It
validates a security interest in the debtor's existing and (upon acquisition) future assets,
even though the debtor has liberty to use or dispose of collateral without being required to
account for proceeds or substitute new collateral.
Id. at Official Comment 2. If the employer files bankruptcy, any improvement in the PBGC's
position during the 90 days before the filing would be avoidable as a preference. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 547(c)(5) (2000).
285 See Keating, supra note 22, at 811 ("[T]he biggest single cause of the PBGC's present
financial crisis is the decision of Congress at the PBGC's inception to guarantee... 'past
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waived funding deficiencies will be added to the amount of the lien. Thus, the lien
would equal: (amount of normal cost miscalculation) + (experience loss) +
(previous waived funding deficiencies) + (current past service liability payments
due). The amount of property subject to the lien would be reduced in subsequent
periods by excess contributions to the plan as a result of underestimating normal
cost contributions (again, depending on PBGC calculations at year-end),
experience gain, and repayment of waived deficiencies, hence the floating nature
of this lien. At the end of each tax year the PBGC will conduct a new analysis of
each plan and either add to or reduce the amount of the lien.
The minimum funding standard and the accompanying excise tax and the
PBGC's floating lien are not mutually exclusive. The minimum funding standard
creates an ex ante target that firms must meet to receive tax benefits. That target is
determined primarily by the firm's actuarial assumptions. Failure to meet this
target results in tax penalties imposed upon the employer. The PBGC's floating
lien mechanism creates ex post liability for the use of incorrect or aggressive
assumptions and experience loss.
Creating a floating lien mechanism to protect the PBGC will reduce the
incentive to divert assets away from pension plans by using aggressive actuarial
assumptions.286 Although such a scheme would not achieve Professor Keating's
goal of moving monitoring responsibility from the PBGC to creditors, 287 it would
serve to put creditors on notice regarding the employer's unfunded pension
obligations, which would limit the employer's access to credit and give the
employer an incentive to meet its pension obligations. Arguably, eliminating the
incentive to underfund a pension plan will eliminate the incentive to provide a
defined benefit plan at all.288 One of the PBGC's mandates is to keep premiums
as low as possible,289 and ostensibly the purpose behind keeping premiums low is
to encourage firms to provide pension plans. Employing a floating lien
mechanism does not require an increase in premiums; it simply requires increased
diligence in making plan contributions and investing plan assets. The only
justification for perpetuating a system that encourages the reallocation of
service liability."'); id at 842 ("It is the insurance of these past service benefits, and not the
Bankruptcy Code, that is the true cause of the current pension crisis.").
286 See supra Part III.A.
287 See Keating, supra note 77, at 65 (recommending "a shift in the pension monitoring
function away from essential reliance on the PBGC and toward employers' creditors" by
creating a PBGC non-lien "super-priority").
288 See id. at 78 ("Merely tightening [minimum funding] standards as a response to the
incentive problem brings on significant costs of its own, including employer exodus from the
defined benefit arena."); id. at 106 ("As the PBGC's premium rates continue to skyrocket,
many finns with properly funded plans have abandoned the defined benefit pension system
altogether and have chosen instead to offer employees defined contribution pension plans or
profit-sharing programs.") (footnote omitted).
289 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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resources away from pension plans would be that the system itself is intended to
create such transfers rather than provide insurance. 29°
The floating lien mechanism compares favorably against Keating's proposed
super-priority. Keating's super-priority would prevent the employer from selling
assets before the PBGC is repaid.291 Keating's proposal appears to encompass the
full amount of liability created under ERISA upon termination,292 or thirty
percent of net worth of the company.293 In contrast, the floating lien covers only
the amount by which the employer's minimum funding contribution proves
inadequate. Additionally, Keating's super-priority attaches to all assets of the
employer, impairing the alienability of the entire bankruptcy estate.294 The
floating lien would necessarily be subordinate to pre-existing secured credit,295
allowing fully secured assets to be transferred without PBGC approval both inside
and outside of bankruptcy. Inside bankruptcy, the PBGC would be treated as any
other secured creditor, entitled to adequate protection before property is sold, but
without power to block the sale of secured assets. 296 In addition, the PBGC's
floating lien would not create a near-insurmountable barrier to post-petition
financing because the court could allow the DIP to obtain credit secured by assets
to which the PBGC's lien might attach, so long as the PBGC receives adequate
protection. 297
Of course, as with any government monitoring activity, the costs of granting
the PBGC authority to force employers to draw their minimum funding
contributions into parity with market realities may exceed the benefits of this
power. This Note has not attempted to quantify the amount by which the moral
hazard created by PBGC insurance leads firms to underfund their pension plans
because the data necessary to do such a study is not immediately available. This
question merits future study within the PBGC.
290 See IPPOLITO, supra note 36, at 5 ("The lack of sound insurance principles embedded
in ERISA suggests to some that the PBGC was not set up to be an insurance firm... [but was
instead] a deliberate attempt to effect transfers to workers and shareholders in troubled firms.").
291 See supra Part V.A.2.
292 See Keating, supra note 77, at 87 (defining the PBGC's "reimbursement claim").
293 See supra note 162.
294 See supra notes 237-50 and accompanying text.
295 Even tax liens are subject to the rule of "first in time, first in right," under which
perfected security interests in existence before the tax lien arises take priority over the tax lien.
See 26 U.S.C. § 6323(a) (2000); United States v. Pioneer Am. Ins. Co., 374 U.S. 84, 88 (1963)
("Choate state-created liens take priority over later federal tax liens... while inchoate liens do
not.").
29 6 See 11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (2000) (providing adequate protection to "an entity that has an
interest in property used, sold, or leased").
297 See id. § 364(d)(1).
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2. PBGC Authority Over Minimum Funding Waivers
Regardless of whether or not a floating lien system is implemented to make
the PBGC a pre-petition secured creditor, the authority to grant minimum funding
waivers should be transferred from the IRS to the PBGC. While the IRS bears the
burden of ensuring that the minimum funding standard is met to determine
eligibility for special tax treatment of contributions to pension plans, the PBGC
bears the risk when minimum funding waivers are granted.298 Were the PBGC
given authority to grant minimum funding waivers, the noticeable absence of any
consideration of its interests when such waivers are granted by the IRS would be
remedied.299 The PBGC is equally as competent to determine whether such
waivers should be granted as the IRS and should, therefore, be given the authority
to do so.
VI. CONCLUSION
The PBGC faces a crisis as the level of underfunding in the pension plans it
insures has expanded rapidly over the last four years. The PBGC has terminated a
record number of plans, assumed an immense amount of liability, and almost
doubled the number of beneficiaries receiving benefits from the PBGC. Some of
these plans have been terminated in bankruptcy by firms seeking to reorganize
under Chapter 11. Because of the moral hazard created by the insurance scheme
under ERISA, these firms have had incentives to divert assets away from their
pension plans for the benefit of shareholders over a long period of time. Because
the Tax Code allows the IRS to waive funding contributions to pension plans
without considering the risk of doing so to the PBGC, and the Bankruptcy Code
leaves the PBGC without the ability to perfect its lien against employers who
terminate underfunded plans post-petition, the PBGC is left without the ability to
protect itself in these situations. Although some commentators have suggested
either granting the PBGC priority under the Bankruptcy Code or a non-
bankruptcy, non-lien super-priority over the firm's assets, these plans could
prevent employers from reorganizing, leading to liquidation. Forcing firms to
fully fund their pension plans could drive many firms to abandon those plans. On
the other hand, there is no apparent benefit to allowing employers to continue
capitalizing on the moral hazard created under ERISA. Therefore, this Note
proposes adopting a floating lien mechanism that would force employers to use
realistic projections when determining contributions to pension plans, make up
for losses experienced by the plan, pay for previous waivers, and meet current
portions of past service liabilities. If requiring firms to meet these minima would
force those firms to liquidate, one is left to ask whether those firms are
economically viable in the first place.
298 See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
299 See supra note 151 and accompanying text.
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This Note has intentionally avoided the debate over whether or not defined
benefit pension plans are necessarily better for retirees than defined contribution
plans, though, as the old saying goes, a bird in the hand is better than two in the
bush. In other words, it may be better for employees if their employers are forced
to make some minimum contribution, even if that contribution is exposed to
market risk when invested, rather than allowing employers to give their
employees the promise of a retirement subject to grave moral hazard. At the very
least, the PBGC should be given the authority to grant minimum funding waivers,
a power that now rests with the IRS. Granting a minimum funding waiver
exposes the IRS to no risk, but doing so can dramatically increase the PBGC's
exposure if the employer granted a waiver terminates its pension plan. Congress
responded to abuse of Chapter 11 reorganization after the Bildisco decision by
placing some constraint on the ability of employers to unilaterally reject labor
contracts in bankruptcy. It is time for Congress to consider legislative change to
prevent firms from using Chapter 11 to evade pension obligations.
